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The Online Advertising Tax as The 
Foundation of a Public Service 
Internet
1. Introduction: Public Service Internet Platforms 
and the Online Advertising Tax
This report introduces a new possibility and policy inno-
vation for taxing online advertising and introducing a 
public service Internet funded by the online advertising 
tax. Prof Christian Fuchs (director of CAMRI, the Com-
munication and Media Research Institute at the Univer-
sity of Westminster) has established a critical theory of 
digital media that provides a framework for the analysis 
of online companies’ political economy, including a the-
ory of digital labour and a digital labour theory of value 
(Fuchs 2008, 2015, 2017a). Insights from this theory shed 
new light on the question how to establish models for tax-
ing online advertising and digital corporations and how 
to use such revenue for fostering public service Internet 
platforms.
Public service Internet platforms are online platforms 
run by public service media organisations. They do not 
have a for-profit imperative, which constitutes a major 
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difference to Google, Facebook, Twitter and other corpo-
rate platforms that use targeted advertising for accumu-
lating capital. One of the key points that this report makes 
is that thus far no viable alternative to the for-profit cor-
porations which dominate the Internet has been created. 
At the same time, however, Europe has a strong public 
service media tradition. Building on this tradition, an 
alternative Internet can be created: Public service media 
are well situated to offer their own online platforms that 
do not follow a for-profit logic, but serve the public inter-
est. In addition, non-profit commons-based platforms 
(so-called platform co-operatives1 run by civil society 
organisations can also help to challenge the power of for-
profit online corporations).
Google and Facebook dominate the online advertis-
ing market in the form of a duopoly and avoid paying 
an adequate and fair share of taxes. In the age of aus-
terity, there has been increased public criticism of the 
comparatively low level of tax contributions that are 
paid by large transnational corporations. This report 
first presents data that show the growing importance 
of online advertising (section 2). Second, it discusses 
Google and Facebook’s online advertising duopoly (sec-
tion 3). Third, Google and Facebook’s tax avoidance 
strategies are analysed (section 4). Fourth, an overview 
of the British Parliament’s Public Account Commit-
tee’s inquiry into tax avoidance is discussed in respect 
to Google and Facebook (section 5). Fifth, some spe-
cific policy measures and ideas of how to counter online 
corporations’ tax avoidance are discussed (section 6): 
voluntary corporate self-regulation, the ‘Google tax’ 
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(diverted profits tax), and the concept of the digital 
permanent establishment. Sixth, a new model of how 
to tax online advertising based on the theory of digital 
labour is introduced (section 7). Seventh, suggestions 
for how a public service Internet could be created based 
on an online advertising tax are introduced (section 
8). Finally, the report draws conclusions and discusses 
their implications (section 9).
2. The Rise of Online Advertising
Google and Facebook are among the world’s largest 
transnational corporations. In the 2017 Forbes ranking 
of the 2000 biggest global companies, Google/Alphabet 
came 24th with an annual profit of 19.5 billion US dol-
lars.2 With a profit of 9.5 billion US dollars, Facebook was 
in 119th place.3 Neither company sells communication 
services; what they sell is online advertising. In economic 
terms, it is thus inaccurate to refer to Google and Face-
book as communications companies. Rather, they are two 
of the world’s largest advertising businesses.
In economic terms, it is thus inaccurate to refer 
to Google and Facebook as communications com-
panies. Rather, they are two of the world’s largest 
advertising businesses
Google and Facebook’s profitability is linked to profound 
changes within the advertising industry. According to 
data gathered by Ofcom (Office of Communications), 
the British regulatory body for media, global advertis-
ing turnover increased by 23.0% to 308.1 billion pounds 
(361.2 billion euros) between 2011 and 2015. Television 





























































































The Rise of Online Advertising 5
advertising is the dominant form of advertising, but its 
share of global advertising turnover fell from 37.1% in 
2011 to 34.4% in 2015 (Table 1). The most significant 
trend is the marked increase of online advertising and 
sharp decline in newspaper advertising: newspaper adver-
tising’s share of global advertising turnover decreased 
from 18.3% in 2011 to 12.2% in 2015 (Table 2). At the 
same time, online advertising rose from 20.7% in 2011 to 
33.1% in 2015 (Table 2).
If these trends continue, online advertising will soon 
also constitute the economically dominant form of adver-
tising at the global level. As advertising taxation usually 
excludes online, and Internet advertising is becoming 
increasingly significant in economic terms, it is of key 
importance that any debate about the taxation of adver-
tising includes discussions on how online advertising can 
be taxed. 
Table 2 shows comparative data gathered by the World 
Advertising Research Center (WARC). 
Table 1: Various advertising forms’ share of global advertising revenue 
in % (source: based on data from Figure 1).
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Online 20.7 23.1 26.1 29.2 33.1
Outdoor advertising 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.4 7.3
Radio 7.7 7.5 7.2 7.1 6.8
Television 37.1 37.2 36.5 35.9 34.4
Magazines 8.0 7.4 6.8 6.2 5.6
Daily newspapers 18.3 16.8 15.3 13.7 12.2
Cinema 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8 The Online Advertising Tax as the Foundation
WARC estimates the 2015 volume of global advertis-
ing at almost 500 billion US dollars (around 478 billion 
euros or 408 billion British pounds). By contrast, Ofcom 
sets global advertising revenue at 361.2 billion euros 
(308   billion British pounds). This shows that different 
sources often provide different data where advertising is 
concerned. However, the WARC data also confirm the 
trend that newspaper and magazine advertising’s share of 
the total volume has fallen sharply and online advertising’s 
share has risen strongly. One interesting aspect of Table 2 
is that the WARC data also provide the share of mobile 
advertising (advertisements on mobile phones). Mobile 
advertising is seen as a subcategory of online advertising. 
According to these data, 30.6% of all online advertising in 
2015 was mobile advertising. Mobile advertising made up 
9.5% of global advertising turnover.
The United Kingdom is particularly significant for the 
debate on taxing online advertising in several regards:
•	 According to WARC data, the United Kingdom 
has the highest advertising turnover in Europe: 
 according to this information, total advertising 
 turnover in the UK was 26.4 billion US dollars 
in 2016. In Germany and France, which are both 
 countries with a higher population than the United 
Kingdom, the total advertising expenditure was 
lower in comparison at 22.0 billion US dollars and 
11.97 billion US dollars respectively.
•	 Great Britain is one of the countries in which 
online advertising makes up the largest share of 
advertising revenue (Table 3). In France and the 
USA, broadcasting advertising (TV and radio) 
accounted for the largest share of advertising 
 revenue in 2015, while in Germany and Austria 
advertising in newspapers and magazines made up 
the largest share (Table 3). In the United Kingdom,  
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however, online advertising was by far the most 
important branch of advertising: 47.4% of the total 
British advertising turnover in 2015 was made 
through online advertising, and 30.9% through 
broadcasting advertising (Table 3). Figure 2 con-
firms this information on the basis of data gathered 
by Ofcom. This structural specificity of the British 
advertising market has to do with the fact that 
there is no advertising on the public service TV 
and radio broadcaster BBC. The BBC’s channels 
are the UK’s most popular for both TV and radio. 
The broadcasting market for advertising in Great 
Britain is thus limited, and so the online market 
is of particular importance to advertisers. Online 
advertising’s dominance in the UK makes this 
country particularly interesting for the question 
of whether and how Internet advertising can be 
taxed. The  situation in the United Kingdom, where 
we see a dominance of online advertising, is one 
that will probably occur globally in the near future.
•	 In 2012 and 2013, the British parliamentary  Public 
Accounts Committee carried out an inquiry into 
the topic of tax avoidance in which Google played 
an important role and as part of which Google 
 representatives were interrogated. This led to 
 important parliamentary and public debates on 
the question of whether and how global online 
 advertising companies such as Google avoid paying 
taxes and what can be done to prevent this.
•	 In April 2015, a law introducing a diverted 
profits tax came into force in the UK. The idea 
behind this is that profits generated in Britain 
and diverted to other countries are subject to a 
25% tax. As corporate income tax is lower than 
25%, this measure aims to encourage companies 
to tax profit generated in the United Kingdom in 
the UK. In public discussion, the tax on diverted 
profit was also referred to as the ‘Google tax’, 
highlighting that the untaxed online advertising 
sector is of particular importance. This debate is 
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Table 3: Share of % of total advertising revenue from various forms in 
selected countries in 2015 (data source: WARC).









34.3% 28.9% 32.1% 30.9% 46.4%
Cinema 0.7% 0.5% 0.4% 1.3% 0.5%
Outdoor 
Advertising
10.1% 5.6% 6.9% 5.8% 3.9%
Online 32.9% 29.5% 13.7% 47.4% 35.4%
Figure 2: Distribution of British advertising expenditure in 2015 based 
on Ofcom data (source: Ofcom 2016b, p. 211, fig 5.30).
thus particularly instructive concerning the ques-
tion of whether and how it is possible to tax online 
advertising within a national context. The United 
Kingdom’s example also provides information on 
The Google and Facebook Online Advertising Duopoly 11
whether companies such as Google have attempted 
to avoid such national regulations and what can be 
done to combat this.
Section 2 has shown the rising economic importance of 
online advertising. The next section will demonstrate that 
there is a concentration of economic power in the online 
advertising industry.
3. The Google and Facebook Online 
Advertising Duopoly
Google and Facebook enjoy a duopoly in the field 
of online advertising: Google is estimated to have 
 controlled 55.2% of global advertising revenue in 2016, 
and Facebook 12.3%.4 Google, which gave itself the 
new company name Alphabet in 2015, had a turnover 
of 74.99 billion and a profit of 16.35 billion US dollars 
in the 2015 financial year (data source: Alphabet 2015). 
Facebook’s 2015 turnover was 17.93 billion US dollars, 
its profit 3.69 billion US dollars. According to WARC, 
advertising turnover worldwide was 499.69 billion US 
dollars and global online advertising turnover 154.73 
billion US dollars in 2015 (see Table 2). According to 
these data, Facebook and Google’s5 joint 2015  turnover 
(91.34 billion US dollars) made up 59.9% of global 
advertising turnover and 18.3% of global advertising 
turnover. According to the Forbes list of the 2000 larg-
est transnational corporations, the British advertising 
and public relations company WPP was the 301st largest 
company in the world and the largest advertising busi-
ness with a profit of 1.8 billion US dollars in the 2015 
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financial year.6 In 2015, however, both Google’s and 
Facebook’s profits were larger than WPP’s: Google’s was 
nine times higher, Facebook’s twice as high. This  illustrates 
the fact that Google and Facebook are the world’s most 
important advertising companies, not traditional adver-
tising corporations. Google and Facebook are not just 
communication and Internet companies; they are the 
world’s largest transnational advertising corporations.
A Financial Times article sums the situation in online 
advertising up as follows: ‘Google and Facebook are the new 
advertising kingpins and Amazon is waiting in the wings. 
[…] This matters because digital is fast  becoming adver-
tising’s biggest source of revenue. It will eclipse  television 
in the US next year, according to eMarketer, the research 
firm, with the lion’s share likely to go to the digital duopoly 
of Facebook and Google. […] Facebook and Google are 
‘hegemons that could soon be taking campaigns away from 
television’, says Brian Wieser, analyst with Pivotal Research’.7 
Google and Facebook’s duopoly has negative impacts 
on public service media. In Austria, there is an advertis-
ing tax, from which online media are exempt. Austria’s 
public service broadcaster (Austrian Broadcasting Cor-
poration, ORF) has repeatedly raised public concerns 
over Google and Facebook and has suggested the intro-
duction of an online advertising tax, which makes Austria 
a particularly interesting case. In the publication Thesen 
zum Medienstandort Österreich (Theses on the Austrian 
Media Landscape, Austrian Broadcasting Corporation. 
2017), the ORF Director General, Alexander Wrabetz, 
sets out ORF’s suggestions for basic media policy innova-
tions and argues for the ‘application of the advertising tax 
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to online-advertising’ (Austrian Broadcasting Corpora-
tion 2017, 15) because currently online ‘providers such as 
Google and Facebook’ (Austrian Broadcasting Corpora-
tion 2017, 15) are exempt by Austria’s 5% tax on adver-
tising revenue, which gives these global corporations an 
unfair advantage. Drawing on the idea of the public ser-
vice Internet, the Theses also argue that as a ‘correction to 
the algorithm-driven filter politics on Facebook, the ORF 
should, as counterpoise, again be allowed to organise 
(advertising-free) online debates’ (Austrian Broadcasting 
Corporation 2017, 11).
Google and Facebook’s online advertising duopoly poses 
a threat to those public service media institutions that are 
funded by a combination of broadcasting licence fees and 
advertising, which can lead to a gap in their finances. The 
Austrian Broadcasting Corporation in 2015 had a revenue 
of 931.1 million euros (ORF 2016). Licence fees made up 
593.6 million euros (63.8%), advertising income in the 
narrower sense 221 million euros (23.7%) (ORF 2016). The 
income generated by special forms of advertising was 42.7 
million euros, that of online advertising 13.5 million euros 
(ORF 2016). If the proportion of online advertising in Aus-
tria continues to rise and broadcasting advertising drops, 
it seems likely that the Google-Facebook online advertis-
ing duopoly will lead to a loss of advertising income for 
the ORF. The trend towards a monopoly or duopoly in the 
increasingly important online advertising sector may have 
negative  consequences for public service media such as the 
ORF. If no countermeasures are taken, this could lead to a 
financing gap or the need to raise broadcasting fees signifi-
cantly, which could prove an unpopular measure.
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Tables 4 and 5 show that Google is the world’s  dominant 
search engine and Facebook the dominant social  network.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a math-
ematical, statistical method that can be used to calculate 
a market’s concentration. The following formula is used 




f = number of companies in industry j
Sij = the market share of company i in industry j
Normalisation to 10,000 (that is, the maximum value is 
10,000, standing for the greatest possible concentration: if 
the index equals 10,000, then there is only one company 
with a market share of 100%):
Table 4: Share of the world’s online searches carried out on  desktop 
computers in 2016 (data source: NetMarketShare: Market Share 
 Statistics for Internet Technologies, http://www.netmarketshare.com, 
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HHI < 1,000: low market concentration
1,000 < HHI < 1,800: medium market concentration
HHI > 1,800: high market concentration
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index can be applied to the 
data represented in Tables 4 and 5 to approximate the 
1 Facebook 1,590
2 WhatsApp 1,000







10 Baidu Tieba 300
11 Skype 300
12 Viber 249









Table 5: Number of globally active users (in millions) on social media in 
April 2016 (data source: SmartInsights, http://www.smartinsights.com/
social-media-marketing/social-media-strategy/new-global-social-
media-research/, last accessed 31 December 2016).
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1 Google Google USA 70.85% 5019.7
2 Microsoft Bing USA 11.61% 134.8
3 Baidu Baidu China 8.14% 66.3
4 Yahoo Yahoo USA 7.48% 56.0
5 IAC Ask, Excite USA 0.25% 0.1
6 AOL Inc. AOL USA 0.13% 0.0
Other 1.54%
HHI: > 5276.8
Table 6: Calculation of the search engine concentration index.
degree of concentration in the global search engine and 
social network markets. To do so, the data need to be 
ordered by company. If a company owns  several  platforms, 
the respective shares of users from each  platform need 
to be added. This is important in the case of Facebook, 
for example, as WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger and 
Instagram are all owned by this company. To calculate 
the degree of social network concentration, we can take 
the number of global active user profiles on which data 
are available according to Table 5 as our population. 
The results for search engine concentration and social 
network concentration are given in Tables 6 and 7.
It is striking that the fields of search engines and social 
networks are both dominated by American companies. 
The Chinese corporation Tencent (QQ, WeChat, Qzone) 
also plays an important role in the social network field, as 
it controls three large social networks and thus contrib-
utes to the concentration of this global market. Chinese 
networks do not usually pursue a global strategy. They are 















































































































































































































































































































































































































18 The Online Advertising Tax as the Foundation
instead restricted to services in the Chinese language that 
target users in China.
The major players in search engines and social media 
do not include any European Internet platforms. In 
Europe, attempts were made for quite a long time to copy 
the Silicon Valley Internet model: start-up businesses 
are set up using venture capital, they gradually increase 
their number of users, and finally they are floated on the 
stock market and a profit-generating economic model is 
introduced. This strategy only works in some cases, such 
as Google and Facebook, and entails the risks inherent 
to financialised capitalism, namely financial bubbles and 
crises such as those of the ‘New Economy’ in 2000 (the 
so-called Dotcom Crisis), when the Internet economy’s 
financial bubble burst.
In 2000, the EU formulated the Lisbon Strategy: part 
of this strategy was to become ‘the most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world’ 
by 2010 (European Council 2000). At least where the 
 Internet economy is concerned, this goal has not been 
reached: the Internet remains dominated by American 
corporations, primarily from California. The EU failed 
to recognise that simply imitating and adapting the 
 Californian model to Europe cannot work, as the 
 European media landscape is structured differently to 
the North American one. In Europe, public service media 
and alternative media (such as the non-commercial ‘free 
radios’) are important. In regard to public service media, 
this means that there is a very large and hitherto scarcely 
used potential to create public service Internet platforms 
to combat the dominance of Google, Facebook and simi-
lar Internet businesses in Europe.
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there is a very large … potential to create public service 
Internet platforms to combat the dominance of Google, 
Facebook and similar  Internet businesses in Europe
In the field of search engines, the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index is larger than 5276.8, and in the field of social net-
works it is 2536.1. This means that these two economic 
areas are very strongly concentrated. Google’s domi-
nance among search engines and Facebook’s among 
social  networks means that there is a trend towards 
 monopolisation. Google and Facebook follow the same 
economic strategy, namely to use personalised adver-
tising (cf Fuchs 2017a, chapters 5 and 6). They operate 
different types of platforms and accordingly offer dif-
ferent information services, but use the same capital 
accumulation online advertising model, leading to a 
duopoly in the field of online advertising.
The online advertising duopoly gives Google and Face-
book tremendous economic power. In addition, these two 
corporations have avoided paying taxes, which is in most 
countries not illegal, but considered immoral by most 
members of the public. Global corporations amass huge 
profits and economic power that is further extended by tax 
avoidance that is tolerated by the state. While many eve-
ryday people suffer under wage stagnation and austerity 
measures’ cuts to public services, many large corporations 
do not much contribute to the funding of the public good. 
The next section discusses strategies of tax avoidance.
4. Google and Facebook’s Tax Avoidance Strategies
Since 2012, when a committee investigating global corpora-
tions’ tax avoidance took up its work in the British House of 
20 The Online Advertising Tax as the Foundation
Commons Public Accounts Committee, this topic has been 
strongly debated in the British public sphere. This reflects a 
general European development: the EU Commission found 
against Ireland for illegal state aid to Apple. Apple massively 
undercut Ireland’s corporate tax, which was already low at 
12.5%: in 2003, Apple only paid tax corresponding to 1% of 
the profit made by its Ireland-based subcontractors, and in 
2014, this had dropped to a mere 0.005% (European Com-
mission 2016b). The Commission ruled that Ireland had to 
demand 13 billion euros in back taxes from Apple. Ireland 
and Apple appealed against this decision (Taylor 2016). 
In January 2016, the Italian tax authorities demanded 
that Google pay 227 million euros in back taxes (Sheffield 
2016). In May 2016, the French police searched Google’s 
Paris headquarters, looking for evidence of suspected tax 
avoidance; in June 2016, the company’s Spanish headquar-
ters in Madrid were searched (The Week 2016). In Decem-
ber 2016, the French parliament approved an amendment 
to the budget according to which a 2% online advertising 
tax is to be levied on YouTube advertisements (Le Monde 
2016, Digital TV Europe 2016). An exception is to be made 
for videos showing the news. This levy, which discussions 
referred to as the ‘YouTube tax’, would also apply to 
 platforms such as Netflix, Dailymotion and Vimeo 
( Roberts 2016).
Tables 8 and 9 show the turnover, profit and tax data of 
the British subsidiaries of Facebook and Google.
Over recent years, such balance sheet data have 
 repeatedly led to public debate on tax avoidance strate-
gies. Facebook UK had a turnover of over 450 million 
pounds between 2007 and 2015, but claimed losses of over 
100 million pounds and received tax credits amounting 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Google and Facebook’s Tax Avoidance Strategies 23
to 10 million pounds in total. At the same time, however, 
Facebook was in the process of becoming the 188th larg-
est transnational company in the world, with a profit of 
3.7 billion US dollars in 2015 (data source: Forbes 2000, 
2016 list). Corporations such as Facebook, whose busi-
ness model consists of the algorithm-based sale of adver-
tising, do not lead to a leap in employment, such that 
in 2015, Facebook UK had 682 employees.8 Google UK 
employed 2,329 people in 2015.9 In 2011, Google UK had 
losses of more than 24 million pounds with a turnover 
of 395.8 million dollars, while globally Google made a 
profit of 9.7 billion US dollars10 and was the world’s 103rd 
largest company (Fuchs 2017a, 154). Because of all this, 
doubts concerning their balance sheets were raised. 
Google paid some back taxes for 2015 and therefore a 
total tax of around £100 million for that financial year. In 
2016, the taxes the corporation paid amounted to around 
£25 million, which was lower than the amount paid in 
2012. As early as 2009, the British newspaper The Sun-
day Times reported on Google’s suspected tax avoidance, 
setting in motion a public discussion that only increased 
over the years:
GOOGLE, the Internet giant with the motto ‘don't 
be evil’, avoids paying more than £100m a year in UK 
tax despite pulling in annual revenues of more than 
£1.25 billion. Even though the web search engine 
operates as Google UK Ltd in London, British firms 
which advertise with it pay their subscriptions to a 
subsidiary based in Ireland, where corporation tax 
is far lower than in the UK. This structure, con-
demned this weekend as ‘unfair’ and ‘unacceptable’, 
allowed Google legally to avoid paying £110m of 
UK tax in 2007, according to research by an expert 
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on corporate tax avoidance. […] Google’s accounts 
show that the highly profitable search engine paid 
just £600,000 of UK corporation tax in 2007, despite 
generating revenues of more than £1.25 billion in 
this country. More than 90% of Google's UK rev-
enues are channelled through Ireland, where corpo-
ration tax is levied at 12.5%, compared with 28% in 
Britain. […] (Watts 2009)
In order to visualise this extent of tax avoidance, Figure 3 
presents the amount of taxes paid and avoided by Google 
in the year 2007 in relation to its UK revenue.
The reason why taxes paid are almost invisible in this 
figure is that the amount of taxes paid in the UK was such 
a small percentage (0.048% to be exact) of Google’s UK 
revenue that year that it almost cannot be observed in a 
standard pie chart visual representation.
Figure 3: Google’s UK revenue, UK tax payments and UK taxes avoided 
in 2017 (source: data from Watts 2009).
Taxes avoided by Google
Taxes paid by Google
Google revenue
Google’s 2007 revenue and taxes
The Sunday Times report goes on to explain that Google’s 
Irish subsidiary is part of one of two companies set up 
by Google in the tax haven of Bermuda. It quotes the 
tax researcher Richard Murphy asking whether it was 
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‘morally right that a company can hoover up £1.25 billion 
of revenues from the UK in a single year and pay back just 
£600,000 of tax?’ (Watts 2009).
Public debate on tax avoidance in the UK reached its 
interim high point in 2013, when 1,062 articles on tax 
avoidance mentioning Google or Facebook were printed 
in British newspapers.11 Google was once again the target 
of criticism:
Google is back in the firing line over its tax affairs 
after the giant Internet firm revealed it paid only 
£11.6m to the Treasury last year, despite generat-
ing $5.5bn (£3.4bn) of business in the UK. […] 
Google’s complex tax arrangements, under which 
sales are booked in Ireland but revenues funnelled 
to a subsidiary in the tax haven of Bermuda, help 
the group pay minimal tax on the billions it earns 
outside the US. Google UK said in its latest accounts 
that it earned pre-tax profits of £37m on a turnover 
of £506m. But the company's most recent annual 
report revealed that the UK accounted for 11% of 
its global revenues, worth $55bn in 2012.’ (Rankin, 
O’Carroll & Monaghan 2013)
According to this report, the reason for the disparity 
between the amount of taxes paid in the UK and the earn-
ings gained in the UK, is that Google’s sales are booked in 
Ireland. However, even for Ireland this arrangement does 
not lead to substantially increased revenues:
the Internet search company's accounts show that 
last year it paid €19m (£15.9m) tax to the Irish 
exchequer despite the Irish subsidiary handling the 
€15.5bn of revenues generated last year in Europe, 
the Middle East and Africa. (Rankin, O’Carroll & 
Monaghan 2013)
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Facebook, too, was repeatedly criticised. Thus, The Guard-
ian reported in 2012:
Facebook has become the latest multinational to 
come under the spotlight for its tax affairs after fig-
ures revealed it paid just £2.9m in tax on profits of 
more than more than £800m. […] Facebook is struc-
tured so that companies buying advertisements on 
the website in the UK, or anywhere outside of the 
US, have to pay Facebook Ireland. This allowed Face-
book Ireland to make gross 2011 profits of £840m – 
or £3.1m per each of its 287 staff. (Neate 2012)
Figure 4: Facebook’s 2011 Ireland profits, tax payments in Ireland and 
Irish corporate tax rate (source: data from Neate 2012).
Facebook prots
Taxes paid by Facebook
Irish corporate tax rate
(12.5%)
Facebook’s 2011 prots and taxes paid 
in relation to Irish corporate tax rate
The above chart shows Facebook’s Ireland revenues 
and tax payments from the year 2011 in relation to the 
 corporate tax rate in Ireland (set at 12.5%). It shows how 
the taxes paid by Facebook were below the Irish corporate 
tax rate which itself is already one of the lowest corporate 
tax rates in comparison with other European countries. 
The Guardian report illustrates how – despite 
 Facebook’s high gross profits – an accounting method 
called the ‘Double Irish’ enabled Facebook Ireland to 
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reduce its taxes to €3.2m. This system makes use of 
 royalty payments as tools to move substantial sums of 
money to other subsidiaries. It was used by Facebook 
to transfer almost ‘£750m to the Cayman Islands and its 
Californian parent in licensing and royalty payments.’ 
After this, Facebook Ireland reported an annual loss of 
£15m even though 44% of Facebook’s $3.15bn (£1.95bn) 
revenues could be attributed to Facebook Ireland. 
‘Like Apple and Google, Facebook uses its Irish sub-
sidiary to reduce its liabilities to HM Revenue & Customs 
and other European tax regimes. Amazon and Starbucks 
also cut their British tax bills by using the same technique 
via other European countries. Last year Facebook paid 
just £238,000 in UK corporation tax – less than the aver-
age pay and bonus of its UK-based staff. Its estimated UK 
revenues amounted to £175m last year’ (Neate 2012).
In 2013, The Financial Times wrote:
A Dublin-based company at the heart of  Facebook’s 
international tax structure used a complex tax 
 avoidance scheme to limit its Irish corporation tax 
bill to €1.9m last year, despite generating  turnover 
of more than €1.7bn. Facebook Ireland Limited, 
which employed 382 people in Dublin,  generated 
a gross profit worth €1.75bn in the year to the end 
of  December 2012. This profit turned into a  pre-tax 
loss of €626,000 when the company paid Facebook 
 Holdings Limited, its Irish-based parent  company, 
€770m in administrative expenses for the use 
of  intellectual property central to its technology 
 platform. The parent company's annual report, which 
was filed recently with Ireland's Company's Regis-
tration Office, shows several of its shareholders are 
Facebook subsidiaries based in the Cayman Islands, 
which does not levy corporation tax. (Smyth, 2013)
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Jim Stewart, a tax expert interviewed for the report in the 
Financial Times, states that it was very likely that Face-
book used a tax avoidance strategy named the 'Double 
Irish' because returns from its Irish-based companies 
showed that they were steered by a Caymans subsidiary. 
This strategy requires two incorporated companies based 
in Ireland. One of these companies would pay royalties 
for the use of intellectual property, the expenses of which 
can be used to reduce the amount of tax paid in Ireland. 
The second company – incorporated in Ireland but not 
Irish tax resident – would then collect ‘the royalties in 
a tax haven such as Bermuda or the Caymans, thereby 
avoiding Irish taxes’ (Smyth 2013).
In 2012 and 2013, the House of Commons’  Public 
Accounts Committee conducted a parliamentary 
 investigation into the tax avoidance phenomenon. The 
next section will look at some of the main arguments 
advanced in that debate. 
5. The Tax Avoidance Inquiry in  
the British House of Commons
If a tax on online advertising is to be implemented, then 
we need to enquire how global tax avoidance can be 
circumvented and what legal framework is required for 
doing so. Thus, a closer investigation of the debate on 
tax avoidance in the British House of Commons’ Public 
Accounts Committee, which dealt with this topic in 2012 
and 2013, seems pertinent.
The Public Accounts Committee of the House of 
 Commons published two reports (House of  Commons 
Committee of Public Accounts 2012, 2013a) dealing directly 
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with Google’s tax avoidance. Matt Brittin,  Google’s Vice-
President for Northern and Central Europe (now Presi-
dent of Business and Operations for Europe, the Middle 
East and Africa) was interrogated. The Select Committee’s 
key conclusions can be summarised as follows:
•	 In regard to the British tax authority HMRC:  
‘HMRC needs a change in mindset in the way it 
approaches collecting tax from multinationals. At the 
moment there is a pervasive acceptance of the status 
quo by the top officials in HMRC and we have seen 
little evidence of a desire to be more assertive. […] 
There is currently a complete lack of transparency 
about why multinationals pay so little corporation 
tax. Global companies structure their companies in 
ways that are impenetrable to the public and HMRC 
disclose very little about their approach to collecting 
tax from them’ (House of Commons Committee of 
Public Accounts 2012, 3). ‘HMRC needs to be much 
more effective in challenging the artificial corporate 
structures created by multinationals with no other 
purpose than to avoid tax. HMRC should now fully 
investigate Google in the light of the evidence pro-
vided by whistleblowers’ (House of Commons Com-
mittee of Public Accounts 2013a, 5).
•	 In regard to Google: 
 ‘Google accepted that profits should be taxed in 
the jurisdictions where the economic activity gen-
erating those profits occurred but it asserted that 
its underlying economic activity arose from the 
innovative software technology underlying its 
Google search engine generated by the US com-
pany. Google also confirmed that it had an entity 
based in Bermuda to protect its intellectual prop-
erty. We consider that the company undermined its 
own argument since it remits its non-USA profits 
(including from the UK) not to the USA but to Ber-
muda and therefore may be depriving the USA of 
legitimate tax revenue as well as the UK’ (House of 
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Commons Committee of Public Accounts 2012, 10).  
‘Google generated US $18 billion revenue from the 
UK between 2006 and 2011. Information on the 
UK profits derived from this revenue is not avail-
able but the company paid the equivalent of just US 
$16 million of UK corporation taxes in the same 
period. Google defends its tax position by claiming 
that its sales of advertising space to UK clients take 
place in Ireland – an argument which we find deeply 
unconvincing on the basis of evidence that, despite 
sales being billed from Ireland, most sales revenue is 
generated by staff in the UK. […] It was clear to us 
that it is Google Ltd’s UK staff who add the value in 
generating revenue in the UK from their close work-
ing with its high-value clients, from whom Google 
Ltd generates 60-70% of its revenue’ (House of Com-
mons Committee of Public Accounts 2013a, 5, 9).
Google’s Matt Brittin was questioned by the  Committee’s 
inquiry on 12 November 2012 and 16 May 2013. 
 Margaret Hodge (Labour), who chaired the committee, 
commented during Brittin’s interrogation that Google’s 
strategy was ‘rather devious’ and constituted ‘calculated 
and [...] unethical behaviour in deliberately  manipulating 
the reality of your business to avoid paying your fair 
share of tax to the common good’ (House of Commons 
 Committee of Public Accounts 2013a). Brittin’s key 
 statements are summarised in the following:
•	 Interrogation of Matt Brittin, Google Vice- President 
for Northern and Central Europe, on 12 November 
2012:
 ‘For the services we provide, the consumers are 
based on the computer science that drives search 
and other technology such as Google Maps and so 
on. That is all done in California. […] But the  bigger 
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thing here is that all the technology that creates the 
economic value, and all the innovation that powers 
Google search, comes out of California. […] The 
17,000 engineers in California who build and con-
tinue to invest in developing the technology create 
the economic value for Google. […] What creates 
economic value for Google is the technology and 
the computer science. […] Tax law suggests that 
you need to pay tax where the economic value is 
created, and we believe that that is there. […] the 
activity and innovation is in the US, which is appro-
priate. […] The advertising, though, just to be clear, 
is not the same as buying a double-page spread in 
The Sunday Times. It is a much more complicated, 
 algorithmically-driven system that is almost as 
complicated as the system of search itself, because 
anybody can target any keyword, anywhere in the 
world, any phrase that is typed, across the multiple 
domains of Google. […] the business in the UK is 
people providing services to Google Ireland […] 
What I would say is, as an international business 
that is a US-owned business, we make choices about 
where we locate and how we set up our structure, in 
order to ensure we can operate successfully and to 
minimise the costs and do the efficient things to run 
our business. That is what we are required to do by 
shareholders and by law, and that is what we do: play 
by the rules and manage our business efficiently. […] 
The fundamental issue for us is that our economic 
activity, which generates the algorithms that make a 
lot of products work, comes from engineering that is 
all coming from California. That is why we pay tax 
where the profits are generated, which is how the tax 
system operates’ (House of Commons Committee of 
Public Accounts 2012).
•	 Interrogation of Matt Brittin, Google Vice-President 
for Northern and Central Europe, on 16 May 2013: 
‘[T]he people in the UK can encourage people to 
use our products and can show them the business 
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 opportunity, but no money changes hands. There is 
no transaction that can be executed by the people 
in the UK, because the transaction is executed with 
the system in a live auction. […] They buy adver-
tising from a platform that is built outside the UK, 
and because 90% of the money they spend is on an 
 auction basis, the prices are set by the platform. […] 
90% of the spend by British companies with Google 
is on an auction basis […] the substance of the sale, 
when the money is spent and changes hands, hap-
pens at the moment somebody searches on the 
technology platform. […] when we chose where to 
operate the lower tax regime was one factor in estab-
lishing us in Ireland. […] The piece that takes place 
in the UK could be that we might come and meet 
with you and talk to you about how many people are 
searching for your product or category on Google; 
we might tell you, typically, how much might it cost 
to show up and pick up clicks on those words’ (House 
of  Commons Committee of Public Accounts 2013a)
Accordingly, Google’s key arguments are as follows:
1.  Computer technology creates value: Google’s value 
derives from its algorithm, technology and software.
2.  Google’s value is created in California: This soft-
ware is developed by engineers in California. 
Accordingly, the creation of Google’s economic 
value takes place in California.
3.  Google should pay taxes in California: Taxes 
should be paid where value is created. In Google’s 
case, that is California.
4.  Online advertising is placeless and thus eludes 
national tax legislation: Google’s advertising trade 
takes place in the placeless Internet, not in a particu-
lar country. Advertising sales do not take place in a 
specific country, but via an auction algorithm that 
is operated by algorithms whose physical location is 
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not clearly defined. Google’s European invoices are 
drawn up in Ireland and there is a trade between 
Google in Ireland and European advertising clients.
5.  Google is not acting illegally but is following the 
law: Google uses locational advantage and a low-
tax system to operate efficiently, successfully and 
within the law. Google follows tax laws. This same 
point is emphasised by Alphabet/Google’s Executive 
 Chairman Eric Schmidt: ‘I think the most important 
thing to say about our taxes is that we fully com-
ply with the law and we'll obviously, should the law 
change, we'll comply with that as well’ (BBC 2013).
However, there are counterarguments to these claims:
1.  Only human beings communicate, creating the 
practical and economic value of the Internet: Only 
humans can create economic value, technology 
 cannot. If there were only machines and no human 
beings, no goods could be produced, distributed 
and consumed. Fully automated production without 
human beings would break down as soon as machines 
stalled and could not be repaired. Unlike human 
beings, machines have no morals, no creativity and 
are unable to anticipate the future state of society, and 
are thus only capable of limited action. In a technolo-
gised society, practical and economic value can only 
be created by humans who act as social and societal 
beings and use technology as a tool in doing so.
2.  Google and Facebook’s users create the value with 
which these companies operate and which they 
sell as Big Data: Google’s software platforms are 
not commodities. We do not pay to use Google’s 
search engine. Google does not sell its search ser-
vice to users. If something is not a commodity and 
is not sold, then its value is unclear. For this reason, 
the argument that Google’s Californian software 
engineers create the company’s entire value is not 
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convincing. Google sells advertising space on the 
Internet using algorithmic auctions. The audience 
commodity theory states that in advertising in gen-
eral, the audience’s attention is sold to advertisers as 
a commodity; in the case of data commodities, the 
users’ personal data are sold to enable personalised 
advertising (Fuchs 2017a). Without the users’ online 
activity, which is precisely monitored and about 
which the Internet corporations collect, store and 
analyse data and metadata, personalised advertising 
on Google and Facebook would not be possible. The 
data commodities and attention to advertising are 
created by the users themselves. The theory of digi-
tal labour assumes that Google and Facebook’s users 
thus create a significant part of the value of these 
platforms, and that this value is not produced by the 
software engineers alone (Fuchs 2017a): the software 
engineers only create the technological platform that 
the users employ to produce content, communicate 
with one another and gather information online, 
which is how social media actually become ‘social’ 
and how the Internet becomes alive, informative and 
communicative in the first place. Without the users’ 
activity, there would thus be no communication and 
no social network – and no profit generated by per-
sonalised advertising, either. Google and Facebook’s 
users create economic value that is expressed in 
these companies’ profits.
3.  Google and Facebook should pay for sold online 
advertisements in the country where these adver-
tisements were personalised: If Google and Face-
book’s value creation takes place where the users are 
and where they create the value of online advertis-
ing, then taxes need to be paid in the country where 
the users are when they look at the advertisements 
(in the case of cost-per-view advertising) or click 
upon it (in the case of cost-per-click advertising).
4.  Online advertising is personalised according 
to countries and locations and therefore is not 
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placeless: While the auction algorithms used by 
Google and Facebook operate on the Internet, 
at each specific point in time that a user accesses 
Google or Facebook, he or she is in a specific coun-
try that has specific tax legislation. The user gives 
his or her attention to the advertising on Google or 
Facebook from this country, sometimes clicking on 
the ad, which leads to a sale of the advertisement. 
Both Google and Facebook personalise advertising 
according to place, that is, for every placement of 
personalised advertising a user sees, that user’s loca-
tion is identified and stored. In purely technological 
terms, it is possible to ascertain which percentage 
of seen and clicked-upon ads occurred in which 
country. As attention, online activity and clicks cre-
ate value for Google and Facebook, taxation should 
be based upon the share of Google and Facebook 
advertising clicks in the respective countries.
5.  Tax avoidance is immoral and should thus be 
legally prohibited and sanctioned: Eric Schmidt 
and Matt Brittin are right that global corporations 
that avoid taxes usually do not break any laws. How-
ever, as many human beings see such conduct as 
immoral, tax avoidance should be legally prohibited 
and laws created that enable the taxation of Google 
and Facebook on a national level. At present, there is 
no such legal foundation.
How precisely does online advertising on Google and 
Facebook work? This is an important question if we are 
to understand where profits are made. In order to place 
personalised advertisements on Google and Facebook, 
advertising customers first need to log into Google or Face-
book’s advertising platform and provide the  content of the 
advertisement, details on personalisation and credit card 
information. Accordingly, step one is to log in on http://
adwords.google.com/ or https://www. facebook.com/ads. 
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The second step is to enter personalisation options:
Figures 5 and 6 show the personalisation options avail-
able on Google and Facebook. These personalisation dia-
logues force advertising clients to specify the location of 
the users to be targeted by the advertisement. On Google, 
one country is pre-set, but it is possible to select all coun-
tries. On Facebook, one has to select at least one country, 
but it is possible to add several more. Selecting all coun-
tries is complicated and takes a lot of time.
The third step is to select a payment option (see the 
examples in Figures 7 and 8): a principal distinction is 
made between cost-per-click and cost-per-view online 
advertising. In the cost-per-click model, advertising 
clients only pay for adverts that viewers click upon. In 
the cost-per-view model, advertising customers pay 
for a certain number of advertisements presented in 
personalised form on profiles (e.g. ‘cost per thousand 
impressions’, which means that the client pays per 1,000 
views of the ad).
Usually a daily or total budget and a maximum offer 
are specified. The online advertising space available on a 
profile, a wall, a search and so on is algorithmically auc-
tioned to all suppliers with matching targeting options. 
Accordingly, the price is not set in advance. In the cost-
per-click model, advertising clients only pay if users click 
on their adverts. In the cost-per-view model, custom-
ers pay for the presented ads. Usually the cost-per-click 
model is used much more frequently than the cost-per-
view model.
As seen above, Google argues that the trade in online 
advertising does not take place in a specific country 
Figure 5: Advertising personalisation in Google.
Figure 6: Advertising personalisation on Facebook.
Figure 7: Advertising model selection on Google.
Figure 8: Advertising model selection on Facebook.
Example Policy Measures for Countering Online Corporations 39
but on the placeless Internet, that the software develop-
ment takes place in California, and that the intellectual 
property rights to the technology are registered on Ber-
muda. Because of this territorial complexity, the question 
of which country is responsible for taxing the profits is 
a complicated one. The same applies to the taxation of 
online advertising: where and in which country does 
online advertising take place? In the country where the 
client is? In the country from which the online advertis-
ing company operates? In the country where the software 
and algorithms are developed? In the country where the 
intellectual rights to the software and algorithms are reg-
istered? Or elsewhere? 
Section 5 has pointed out arguments that global online 
corporations use for justifying tax avoidance. A num-
ber of counter-arguments have been formulated. The 
next section will discuss a number of measures that have 
been suggested in the public debate in response to the 
tax avoidance strategies of online corporations and other 
global companies. It will also point out the limits of these 
measures.
6. Example Policy Measures for Countering Online 
Corporations’ Tax Avoidance: Voluntary Corporate 
Self-Regulation, the ‘Google Tax’ (Diverted Profits 
Tax), and the Digital Permanent Establishment
Thus far, the public policy discourse on tax avoidance 
has focused on several suggested measures. These have 
for example included voluntary corporate self-regulation 
(6.1), the diverted profits tax/‘Google tax’ (section 6.2), or 
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the digital permanent establishment (section 6.3). These 
example measures and their limits will be discussed step-
by-step in this section. 
6.1. Voluntary Corporate Self-Regulation 
In late-2017, Facebook announced that it would stop 
routing advertising through Ireland in European coun-
tries where it has a local branch (Guardian 2017). Face-
book’s chief financial officer Dave Wehner said: ‘We 
believe that moving to a local selling structure will pro-
vide more transparency to governments and policymak-
ers around the world who have called for greater visibility 
over the revenue associated with locally supported sales 
in their countries’ (Guardian 2017). 
But this suggestion has three flaws:
•	 It is a voluntary measure by Facebook that is not 
based on legislation and clear policy rules that deter-
mine where Facebook has to pay taxes for what 
activities and to which amount.
•	 Facebook does not have branches in all countries of 
the world, which means that it will continue to avoid 
paying taxes. In 2018, Facebook’s European offices 
were located in Belgium, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. According to the 
United Nation’s classification, there are 44 countries 
in Europe, which means that according to its own 
rules, Facebook would continue not to pay taxes in 
36 European countries.
•	 There is still no policy rule that determines which 
amount of value shall be taxed in what country.
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6.2. The ‘Google Tax’ (Diverted Profits Tax)
In the United Kingdom, the diverted profits tax was 
introduced as part of the Finance Bill 2015, entering into 
force on 1 April 2015. It can be seen as a reaction to pub-
lic debate on transnational corporations’ tax avoidance, 
including online corporations. Will this new measure 
help to effectively tax online advertisements of global 
Internet corporations such as Google and Facebook? This 
section discusses this question.
In public discussions, the diverted profits tax is often 
referred to as the ‘Google tax’, as Google was the prime 
example of a transnational corporation involved in tax 
avoidance. The use of the name ‘Google tax’ suggests that 
this legislation has made it possible to tax Google on a 
national basis. The diverted profits tax is relevant to the 
debate on online advertising tax, as the latter’s implemen-
tation would probably raise similar questions to those 
arising in connection with the former.
The basic idea behind the diverted profits tax is that 
profits generated in the UK and diverted to other coun-
tries are taxed, so tax avoidance becomes less attractive. 
Diverted profit is taxed at 25%. By contrast, British cor-
poration tax for 2017, 2018 and 2019 is 18% and 17% 
for 2020. The fact that corporation tax is lower than the 
diverted profits tax is supposed to encourage companies 
not to divert profits generated in the United Kingdom 
abroad to avoid taxes but instead tax them in the UK.
The key legislative regulation in the Finance Bill 2015 
states:
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‘§79 Charge to tax:
(1) A charge to diverted profits tax is imposed for 
an accounting period by a designated HMRC officer 
issuing to the company a charging notice in accord-
ance with section 95 or a supplementary charging 
notice in accordance with section 101(8).
(2) The amount of tax charged by a notice is the sum 
of –
(a) 25% of the amount of taxable diverted profits 
specified in the notice, and
(b) the interest (if any) on the amount within para-
graph (a) determined under subsection (4).’12
Then Chancellor George Osborne said in the 2014 autumn 
statement in which he announced the diverted profits tax:
Some of the largest companies in the world, includ-
ing those in the tech sector, use elaborate structures 
to avoid paying taxes. […] Today I am introducing a 
25% tax on profits generated by multinationals from 
economic activity here in the UK which they then 
artificially shift out of the country. That’s not fair to 
other British firms. It’s not fair to the British people 
either. Today we’re putting a stop to it. My message 
is consistent and clear. Low taxes; but taxes that will 
be paid. Britain has led the world on this agenda. 
And we do so again today. This new Diverted Profits 
Tax will raise over £1 billion over the next 5 years 
(Osborne 2014).
Then Economic Secretary to the Treasury Andrea Lead-
som specified the details of the tax (House of Commons 
2015a):
Specifically, the diverted profits tax applies in two 
situations. The first is where a foreign company car-
ries out activities in the UK in connection with the 
supply of goods or services to UK customers in such 
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a way that it avoids creating a permanent establish-
ment, and the main purpose of that arrangement is 
to avoid UK tax, or a tax mismatch is secured such 
that the total tax derived from UK activities is signifi-
cantly reduced. The second situation is where a UK 
company, or a foreign company with a UK perma-
nent establishment, creates a tax mismatch by using 
transactions or entities that lack economic substance. 
At the second and third reading of the draft legislation 
in the House of Commons, politicians in the opposition 
raised the following points of criticism:
•	 The Act does not apply to credit agreements whereby 
multinational corporations give credit to their sub-
sidiaries in countries with a higher corporation tax 
so that the interest can be deducted from tax, the 
subsidiaries are granted tax relief, and the interest 
payments are diverted to offshore havens (Fiona 
O’Donnell, Labour Party).
•	 The new Act was introduced into parliament too 
quickly, so there was insufficient time available to 
evaluate and discuss in detail the complex legal texts 
necessary to prevent tax avoidance (Chris Leslie, 
Labour Party/Co-operative Party).
•	 Internet companies constitute a particular problem 
as they can operate from anywhere in the world. 
They function differently from companies that sell 
physical goods. Territorial jurisdiction is a particu-
lar problem and difficult to implement. It is not the 
country’s jurisdiction where the company’s server is 
located which is responsible, but the country where 
the client is. There is still much more that needs to 
be done to regulate Internet corporations in this way 
(Ian Swales, Liberal Democrats).
The Finance Bill 2015 was passed by the House of Com-
mons on 25 March 2015 with 307 yea votes to 226 nays; 
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it was confirmed on 26 March by the House of Lords and 
subsequently granted Royal Assent. The diverted profits 
tax thus entered into force on 1 April 2015.
In January 2016, HMRC and Google reached an agree-
ment that the Internet company would pay 130 million 
pounds in back taxes covering the period from 2005 to 
2015. Google UK’s tax statement for January 2014 to June 
2015 thus contains a back-tax payment of 69,230,747 
pounds, referenced as ‘Tax audit settlement in respect 
of prior periods’. This settled part of the agreed back tax 
payment. Then Chancellor George Osborne commented 
in January 2016: ‘When I became the chancellor, Google 
paid no tax. Now Google is paying tax and I have intro-
duced a new thing called a diverted profits tax to make 
sure they pay tax in the future. I regard that as a major 
success’ (Mason, Weaver and Kirchgaessner 2016).
The tax expert Prem Sikka, Professor of Accounting at 
the University of Essex, made the following calculation 
(Sikka 2016). He estimated that Google had made a profit 
of 7.2 billion pounds in the United Kingdom between 
2005 and 2015 (Boffey and Treanor 2016). According to 
Sikka (2016), Google’s back tax payment and the actual 
taxes paid amounted to 200 million pounds for the 
period in question. According to this estimate, the actual 
tax paid was only 2.8% of profit, even though the aver-
age corporation tax was 25%. Sikka (2016) thus concludes 
that Google should have paid 1.8 billion pounds rather 
than just 200 million in taxes: ‘The settlement seems to be 
a sweetheart deal by HMRC to collect something rather 
than what may be owed’ (Sikka 2016).
Shadow chancellor John McDonnell (2016) of the Labour 
Party criticised the diverted profits tax as ineffective:
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This deal looks like mate’s rates for taxes. It’s totally 
unacceptable that while most of us pay the taxes 
expected of us – recognising that part of living in a 
civilised society is ensuring that everyone who can 
makes a fair contribution to vital public services – a 
major multinational can, first, pay virtually no cor-
poration taxes for a decade, and then pay what is a 
tiny amount relative to its deep pockets. […] The 
so-called Google tax had its sights set on precisely 
those major tech firms making most assiduous use 
of accountancy devices. […] The Google tax is a 
dead letter: and if Google can so easily duck this tax, 
with its own Tory tax deal, what exactly will stop any 
other tech firm doing the same? (McDonnell 2016). 
The House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts 
(2013b) reported in 2013 that the four major accounting 
firms Deloitte, Ernst and Young, KPMG and Pricewater-
houseCoopers (PwC) had massive resources that they 
could muster to advise corporations on how to use interna-
tional tax legislation to pay as little tax as possible. By con-
trast, HMRC had comparatively few resources to combat 
tax avoidance at its disposal. The Committee furthermore 
had the impression that these four firms had close links to 
the government and were thus able to unduly influence the 
tax system. Accountancy firms negotiated secret tax deals 
with financial authorities, as revealed by the Luxembourg 
tax scandal in which such files had been leaked (House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounts 2015).
The House of Commons Public Accounts Commit-
tee also examined the compromise between Google and 
HMRC, criticising it sharply in one of its reports:
The lack of transparency about tax settlements 
makes it impossible to judge whether HMRC has 
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settled this case for the right amount of tax. […] 
The small amount of tax paid in proportion to the 
scale of Google’s UK activities means that there are 
legitimate questions about this settlement; we still 
do not know if Google paid the right amount of tax. 
[…] Google was not required to pay any penalty as 
part of the settlement. HMRC told us that the cur-
rent penalty legislation does not work in relation to 
large businesses in the way that it should. […] The 
international tax rules are not working, such that 
HMRC seems unable to collect a fair share of cor-
poration tax from global companies with activities 
in the UK. […] Multinational companies seem to 
be able to control how much corporation tax they 
pay in each country by the way they structure their 
business and allocate profits between their overseas 
entities. The fact that companies can do this within 
the rules shows that the corporation tax system is in 
urgent need of reform. (House of Commons Com-
mittee of Public Accounts 2016)
One decisive point of criticism made in this report is that 
it is obviously legal for transnational corporations not to 
enter the turnover generated in a particular country in 
that country, but instead to allocate parts of their overall 
turnover to various international subsidiaries as they see 
fit. We have seen that Internet companies argue that their 
revenue is generated in the global, placeless Internet, not 
in specific countries, and that therefore certain subsidiar-
ies merely provide services to the headquarters in another 
country and no sales take place in the countries in which 
these subsidiaries are located. In Google’s 2012 interro-
gation, the British Public Accounts Committee already 
drew attention to this problem: ‘Chair [Margaret Hodge]: 
Mr Brittin, we are not naive. The revenues in the UK are 
those that you choose to put through the UK. What we 
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are interested in is the actual revenues you earned in the 
UK’ (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts 
2012, 10). The 2016 report of the Public Accounts Com-
mittee shows that this problem has not been solved by the 
tax on diverted profits but continues to exist.
In a parliamentary debate on tax avoidance by multina-
tional corporations, John McDonnell expounded on this 
topic further on 3 February 2016: 
We cannot allow the Government to go on like this. 
Trust and confidence in our tax system is being 
undermined. Every pound in tax avoided by these 
large corporations is a pound taken from the pockets 
of honest taxpayers. It is also a pound not spent on 
our schools, our NHS and our police. We need a real 
tax reform agenda, based on the principle of com-
plete openness and transparency. First, that means, 
as a start, the publication of the details of this deal 
[between HMRC and Google] in full, so that we and 
our constituents can judge whether it is fair enough. 
Secondly, we need real country-by-country report-
ing of a company’s activities, and not just a secret 
exchange of information between tax authorities, but 
full publication so that we can all judge. [...] Thirdly, 
we need an end to mates’ rates and sweetheart deals 
with major corporations. Tax law should be applied 
fairly whatever the size of the company. Fourthly, we 
need full transparency in the relationship between 
Ministers and companies, so I want to see publica-
tion of all the minutes of all such meetings. Fifthly, 
we need firmer action to curb the tax avoidance 
industry, so action should be taken against the advis-
ers when the tax avoidance schemes they designed 
are found to be unlawful by tax tribunals and courts. 
The same advisers advise Her Majesty’s Treasury and 
help write our tax laws. That is unhealthy and unac-
ceptable. […] Sixthly, we clearly need independent 
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scrutiny of HMRC and the implementation of taxa-
tion policy overall. (House of Commons 2016)
One key point made in these elaborations is the demand 
that the activities of transnational corporations need to 
be analysed country by country. Where online advertis-
ing is concerned, the implication is that it is important 
to divide up and account for advertising turnover and 
advertising profit according to country, in line with the 
users’ actual online activity.
In September 2016, Facebook submitted its 2015 tax 
statement. It was drawn up and certified by Ernst and 
Young, one of the four large accounting firms that attracted 
public criticism in the UK. Facebook claimed to have had 
a turnover of 210,762,610 pounds in United Kingdom in 
2015. This turnover was the result of ‘the provision of sales 
support, marketing services and engineering support to 
the Facebook group’ (p. 16). Over 255 million pounds 
of ‘administrative expenditure’ were deducted from this 
income (p. 7), so that Facebook made a loss of 52,491,963 
pounds and thus received tax credits of 11,322,063 
pounds. In 2015, Facebook’s global turnover was 17.928 
billion US dollars and a profit of 3.688 billion US dollars.13 
Doubts concerning the credibility of these UK losses  were 
voiced, given Facebook’s high international profit ( Bowers 
2016). Tax expert Richard Murphy commented: ‘Face-
book's UK accounts do not represent its real sales in this 
country, which are actually booked in Ireland with their 
true value never being disclosed. […] The Facebook UK 
accounts just record the costs it incurs in the UK, with 
a bit of profit added on to keep HMRC happy. That's 
not good enough in the current climate. Facebook UK's 
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accounts are an exercise in opacity when what we really 
need is transparency. If accountants continue to refuse to 
provide what users of accounts need then it will be time 
for the government to act’ (Johnston 2016). 
Even after the introduction of the diverted profits tax, 
transnational corporations may be continuing to shift 
their turnover between their international subsidiaries. 
John McDonnell’s demand that transnational corpora-
tions structure their finances according to individual 
countries and their real activities there thus seems par-
ticularly pertinent. 
The public debate raised further points of criticism on 
the diverted profits tax:
•	 Only large corporations with a British turnover of at 
least 10 million pounds are affected, while the Act 
does not apply to small and medium-sized enter-
prises or one-off transactions (Murphy 2014).
•	 Individual tax arrangements between corporations 
and financial authorities are not affected by the tax 
(Murphy 2014).
•	 It remains unclear whether HMRC, with its scant 
resources, will actually be able to monitor compli-
ance with this law adequately (Murphy 2014).
•	 As corporation tax is being lowered continuously 
at the same time as the introduction of the diverted 
profits tax (2013: 23%, 2014: 21%, 2015/2016: 20%, 
2017/2018/2019: 19%, 2020: 17%), there is a risk that 
state income from corporation tax will continue to 
sink drastically if it turns out that transnational com-
panies’ tax avoidance cannot be curbed effectively.
Several conclusions for our topic of online advertising 
tax can be drawn from the debate on the British diverted 
profits tax:
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•	 The British government has made a notable attempt 
to prevent the tax avoidance of transnational corpo-
rations on a national level in the form of the diverted 
profits tax. This attempt could boost other countries’ 
attempts to introduce taxation on a national level, 
such as the introduction of an online advertising tax. 
We often hear that there is no point in taxing capi-
tal, as capital is flexible, global and networked and 
is thus able to elude any national attempt at regula-
tion. The alternative would be to wait until there is a 
global capital tax; however, there are no correspond-
ingly global political institutions that could imple-
ment such a tax. The example of the diverted profits 
tax shows that the national level can attempt to take a 
first step towards taxing global corporations. Initia-
tives such as this could then lead to similar develop-
ments in other states or on a regional level (such as 
the EU).
•	 Thanks to non-transparent agreements between 
Google and the British tax authorities, Google’s cor-
poration tax back payments have been low, nor was 
any kind of sanction imposed. Large international 
accountancy firms construct tax avoidance strate-
gies for transnational corporations and are often 
able to successfully lobby governments, leading to 
business-friendly arrangements being made. The 
British Treasury possesses only limited resources 
to counter tax avoidance effectively and efficiently. 
Where online advertising tax is concerned, this case 
teaches us that its implementation will require both 
the creation of sanction regulations that are applied 
in the case of non-compliance as well as a significant 
strengthening of the financial authorities’ resources 
so they can carry out the monitoring and adminis-
trative work necessary.
•	 As the financial authorities in the country in which 
a company’s goods are produced or the parent com-
pany has its headquarters are usually regarded as hav-
ing jurisdiction over corporation tax, multinational 
Example Policy Measures for Countering Online Corporations 51
corporations are often able to shift their turnover 
and profit between their subsidiaries in individual 
countries as it suits them in order to avoid taxation. 
There are indications that this phenomenon still per-
sists despite the introduction of the tax on diverted 
profits. This problem is exacerbated in regard to 
Internet corporations as the Internet is global and no 
base in another country is needed for online trading. 
Accordingly, any online advertising tax introduced 
will be affected by this fact. In these cases, the spe-
cific nature of online advertising needs to be taken 
into account, namely that it involves not only a sup-
plier and a client, but a) the Internet platform, b) 
users who generate content and data and c) advertis-
ers in various countries. Due to the important role 
played by the users of online platforms based upon 
personalised advertising, it seems appropriate to tax 
online advertising in the location where the platform 
users are at the point of time they click or view an 
advertisement. This requires an overview of the vol-
ume of the respective platform’s online advertising 
broken down by country.
6.3. The Digital Permanent Establishment
In July 2017, a court in France ruled that Google/Alphabet 
did not have to pay back taxes of over 1 billion euros 
because it did not have a permanent corporate establish-
ment in France. The EU looked into developing a legal 
basis that is based on the concept of a digital permanent 
establishment. In 2015, the European Parliament passed 
a resolution that called on the European Commission 
to ‘adjust the definition of “permanent establishment” 
so that companies cannot artificially avoid having a 
taxable presence in Member States in which they have 
economic activity’, which should include a definition of 
52 The Online Advertising Tax as the Foundation
a ‘significant digital presence’ (European Parliament 2015). 
In September 2017, the European Commission (2017) 
published a communication on fair taxation of digital 
corporations:
The current tax rules no longer fit the modern con-
text where businesses rely heavily on hard-to-value 
intangible assets, data and automation, which facili-
tate online trading across borders with no physical 
presence. […] As a result, some businesses are pre-
sent in some countries where they offer services to 
consumers and conclude contracts with them, tak-
ing full advantage of the infrastructure and rule of 
law institutions available while they are not consid-
ered present for tax purposes (European Commis-
sion 2017, 2). 
Digitalisation has acted as a facilitator and accel-
erator of cross-border trade (3) […] The underlying 
principle for corporation tax is that profits should 
be taxed where the value is created. However, in a 
digitalised world, it is not always very clear what that 
value is, how to measure it, or where it is  created (7) 
businesses are now able to have a significant eco-
nomic presence in a market jurisdiction without 
necessarily having a substantial physical presence. 
[…] Arriving at a meaningful solution to capture 
and allocate the value created in the digital economy 
across countries can take time (9).
The European Commission certainly correctly recognises 
the problem that value-production on the Internet has 
a transnational character and that therefore policy rules 
are needed that define how to determine what share of 
value needs to be taxed where. But it does not provide a 
concrete definition of a digital permanent establishment 
based on insights into where the value of digital corpora-
tions is created and by whom it is created.
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The European Commission favours the Common Consol-
idated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) proposal that wants 
to determine that a digital permanent establishment is 
based on assets, labour and sales. In a draft- Directive on 
a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base from 2016, 
the following formula is suggested for calculating the tax 
base of a corporation in a specific EU country (European 
Commission 2016a, article 28[1]):
Tax based on establishment A of a corporation =
Sales(A)1

















× Consolidated Tax Base
So, this proposal suggests to assume that the tax base 
of a corporation’s specific national establishment shall 
be determined by the sum of one-third of that national 
establishment’s share of total sales, one-sixth of its share 
of salaries, one-sixth of its share of the total number of 
employees, and one third of its share of total fixed capital.
In the case of online corporations, the question that 
arises is how to determine where commodity sales 
take place and where the capital assets and workers are 
located. When software engineers, marketers, warehouse 
workers and drivers are employed, then there is a clear 
national presence of people and physical assets. There are, 
however, also cases, where the value is not just created by 
paid employees, but also by unpaid users (as in the case of 
Google and Facebook, the two largest online advertising 
corporations). If applied to a digital establishment, then 
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the suggested formula does not take this circumstance 
into account. 
If we think of an online platform, then it is also difficult 
to determine where fixed assets are located. Of course, 
there will in most cases be physical assets such as server 
farms and offices, but online businesses’ key assets are 
made up of intangible resources such as algorithms, web 
platforms, and software code. In the case of stock-market 
listed digital corporations, there is both a monetary price 
of operational capital that is objectified in fixed capital 
assets, including intangibles and digital resources, as well 
as a fluctuating stock market value. This means that in 
such cases there are two monetary expressions of constant 
capital. In addition, there is an annual amount of labour-
hours of the paid and unpaid workers involved in this dig-
ital business. Labour-time, salaries, the price of tangible 
and intangible assets, profits, and stock market values are 
five different economic aspects of a digital corporation.
Another problem of the suggested formula is that one 
of its elements, the annual sales, are themselves made up 
of salaries, annual constant capital investments, and prof-
its. This means that the three factors (sales, labour, assets) 
are overlapping and that the formula therefore double-
counts certain aspects. The formula furthermore implies 
that economic values are not just generated by humans, 
but also by non-human assets (including machines, 
algorithms, and code). There are three options for a 
labour-theory of value: (1) machines create economic 
value, (2) humans create economic value, (3) humans 
and machines create economic value. A humanist theory 
assumes that only humans can create economic value and 
that they make use of machines and resources as a means 
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of production and a means for the creation of value. In 
a humanist approach, machines do not create value, but 
rather humans transfer part of the value of machines to 
the product via their labour. In determining the corpo-
rate tax base of digital businesses, it is important to not 
just think about where and how much value is created, 
but also who creates values, which determines the factors 
that should be incorporated into a formula for apportion-
ment. In the next section, a model will be introduced that 
is based on the question who creates the value of online 
corporations.
In late February 2018, the political news organisation 
Politico obtained and leaked a European Commission 
draft report on the ‘Taxation of Digital Activities in the 
Single Market’ (Smith-Meyer and Plucinska 2018). The 
draft report and subsequent draft directive14 consider the 
possibility of introducing an EU Directive on Digital Per-
manent Establishments that also defines rules for how to 
allocate the profits of such establishments.
The draft report argues that such a Directive could 
define that a digital permanent establishment exists in a 
member state if an annual revenue of more than 7 million 
Euro is achieved or there are more than 100,000 annual 
users of the establishment’s platform in that country. It 
argues for introducing a digital services tax of 3 percent 
on the gross revenue of digital permanent establishments. 
The document speaks of ‘user value creation’ and argues 
that ‘user participation plays a central role in the crea-
tion of value for the company’. Furthermore, it says that in 
allocating such businesses’ profits one must consider that 
‘in the digital economy, a significant part of the value of a 
business is created where the users are based and data is 
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collected and processed’ and that therefore users’ engage-
ments with a platform, user data, the number of users of a 
platform and user-generated content should be taken into 
account for allocating profits to countries. The tax would 
be limited to large digital corporations with a worldwide 
annual revenue of more than 750 million Euro and an 
annual European revenue of at least 50 million Euro.
One has to wait and see if the EU will indeed introduce 
a Directive that taxes online revenues of large digital cor-
porations. If this will be the case, then the question arises 
how exactly the value added by users can be defined, what 
different types of online business model and therefore of 
digital value generation must be discerned, and how such 
value generation can precisely be measured. The next sec-
tion provides ideas on methods for taxing online adver-
tising and digital value.
Sections 5 and 6 have given an insight into some 
aspects of the public debate on online corporations’ tax 
avoidance strategies and into the question of what can 
be done against it. Voluntary measures, the ‘Google tax’ 
and the concept of the digital permanent establishment 
have limits. The next section introduces a new method 
for taxing online corporations. A key insight that has 
been advanced thus far in this report is that online clicks 
and online activities take place in specific countries, from 
which users access the Internet and the platforms they 
use, and that the use of corporate social media is a form of 
value-generation and economic production of data that 
is sold to advertising clients. The next section builds on 
this argument in order to introduce a method for taxing 
online advertising and digital value.
A Method for Taxing 57
7. A Method for Taxing Online Advertising and 
Digital Value
7.1. Media Reforms: Towards an Online Advertising Tax 
There is no advertising tax in the United Kingdom and the 
United States today. However, media reform movements 
have repeatedly attempted to introduce an advertising 
levy. The American media economist Robert McChesney 
believes that the monopolistic power of the large media 
corporations poses a threat to democracy, the freedom of 
opinion and the freedom of the media. He suggests a sys-
tem in which every citizen is given an annual voucher of 
200 US dollars that can be donated to a non-profit news 
or media organisation (McChesney & Nichols 2010, 201; 
McChesney 2012, 212–214). McChesney anticipates an 
increase in the plurality of the media system if this citi-
zens’ news voucher is put into practice. McChesney and 
Nichols (2010, 209–211) suggest a 2% advertising tax as 
one of the measures for financing this citizens’ voucher.
Due to the strong commercialism of the media sys-
tem in the USA, public service media have traditionally 
been weak. The path towards the establishment of public 
service media was a tough one, full of obstacles, and it 
took until 1967 until the passing of the Public Broadcast-
ing Act that led to the creation of the Public Broadcast-
ing Service (PBS) and National Public Radio (NPR). PBS 
has existed since 1970. Local stations that are more or 
less public in nature also play an important role. PBS is 
structured as a network of local, non-commercial, edu-
cational broadcasting stations. In 2013 41% of public tel-
evision’s budget came from taxes, 25% from individuals 
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(donations, membership fees), 17% from businesses, 4% 
from universities and 17% from other sources.15 
The US media reform group Free Press (2010) proposed 
the introduction of an advertising tax in the USA to pro-
vide better funding for public service media, which would 
strengthen these media and enhance media diversity. It 
envisages two possibilities: a direct advertising tax would 
tax the media’s advertising income at a certain rate (Free 
Press suggests a 2% rate). The second kind of advertising 
tax is an advertising sales tax to be borne by those buying 
advertising time or advertising space that is added to the 
price of the advertisement. The third kind is an indirect 
advertising tax. In the USA, companies are able to deduct 
100% of their advertising costs from tax. Free Press sug-
gested that the deductible percentage be reduced and cer-
tain industries (e.g. alcohol, tobacco) excluded from this 
deductibility, which would lead to increased tax revenue. 
In Free Press’s proposal, the revenue generated through 
the advertising tax should be used to strengthen public 
media in the USA.
In the United Kingdom, the Media Reform Coalition 
advocates a similar concept (Co-ordinating Committee 
for Media Reform 2011). It suggests introducing a tax on 
the turnover or profit of certain media industry sectors, 
such as Internet advertising, Internet service providers, 
mobile phone providers and hardware producers. The 
income generated through this measure should be used to 
finance public journalism and local media  cooperatives. 
Concerning concepts for media reform such as these, 
which aim among other things to tax the online advertis-
ing revenue of corporations such as Google and Facebook, 
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it is important to note that tax law is organised nationally 
while the Internet, Internet economy and online advertis-
ing operate on a global level.
legislative change is needed before Google and 
Facebook’s online advertising can be taxed
Google and Facebook’s tax avoidance is possible precisely 
because these global companies operate in the global 
Internet and their tax avoidance is supported by the tax 
legislation of rival nation states that compete against one 
another through tax dumping and liberal business regu-
lations. It is important to recognise that while many peo-
ple certainly regard Google and Facebook’s tax avoidance 
strategies as immoral, these strategies are not in fact ille-
gal in many countries. For this reason, legislative change 
is needed before Google and Facebook’s online advertis-
ing can be taxed.
7.2. A Model For Taxing Online Advertising
Existing conditions, which fail to prevent tax avoidance 
effectively, make it possible for profits to be moved to 
low-tax countries, so that advertising-based online com-
panies pay hardly any taxes.
Trade is the exchange of two commodities in a certain 
quantitative proportion. In monetary economies, money 
takes on the role of a universal means of exchange, and 
thus commodities are exchanged for money. Neither 
Google’s search engine service nor its advertising auc-
tion algorithm is sold. Accordingly, they are not com-
modities, but investment capital, which serves as a tool 
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to create value but does not create value in itself – it is 
dead. Neither software nor algorithms are alive in the way 
that the Internet’s human users are. Technology consti-
tutes only the context and infrastructure of human online 
communication.
If I look at a personalised online advert and click on 
it, I am redirected to a certain webpage belonging to the 
advertising client. The advertising client hopes that I will 
purchase a certain product on his or her website or carry 
out a certain action. And he or she will pay a certain 
amount to the online advertising company (e.g. Google, 
Facebook, etc.) as the advertisement was seen or clicked 
upon. Accordingly, the sale of the advertisement as a 
commodity takes place when it is viewed or clicked upon. 
The advertising client pays for users’ personalised atten-
tion, which is only possible thanks to the collection and 
analysis of personal data. What is sold is thus users’ atten-
tion to advertising. The user’s online behaviour generates 
the data and metadata needed to enable and personalise 
online advertising. The activity of giving attention to an 
online ad or clicking on it finally leads to the monetary 
transaction between the advertising supplier and the 
advertising client. If the suppliers of online advertising 
had only their software and algorithms but no content, 
data and metadata generated by the users, they would not 
be able to sell online advertising. Accordingly, the users’ 
online activity creates the value of online advertising.
users’ online activity creates the value of online 
advertising
Any levy on online advertising introduced in law will be 
difficult to collect if the law’s wording states that the tax 
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must be paid in the country of the advertising company’s 
main office. The examples of Google and Facebook show 
that transnational companies operate in many countries 
at the same time, which means tax jurisdiction is not 
clearly defined. By contrast, if we argue that the users to 
whom personalised advertisements are presented (cost-
per-view) or who click on such an ad (cost-per-click) cre-
ate the value of the online advertisement and that online 
advertising should be taxed in the country where the 
users at whom it is targeted are, the territorial allocation 
becomes much easier: in this model, the assumption is 
that specific national tax legislation applies if I, as a user, 
am in this country and click on an online advertisement. 
If I happen for example to be in Germany, then German 
tax law applies. In order to make online advertising fea-
sible in terms of taxation, we can thus choose to view the 
location not of the online corporation, but of the users as 
being most significant, then it is the location where the 
service is performed and where it should be taxed.
we can thus choose to view the location not of the 
online corporation, but of the users as … most 
significant
Maarten de Wilde (2015) argues that profit is usually 
taxed in the location where a commodity’s value is pro-
duced, while value-added tax regulations usually focus 
on the target country where the commodity is sold. The 
Internet’s global nature renders the application of tradi-
tional tax legislation difficult, as an Internet company is 
able to sell digital commodities in countries where it has 
no physical or legal presence. According to de Wilde, the 
view that online profits should be taxed where the clients 
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are, is becoming increasingly prevalent. Moreover, it has 
the advantage that the location can be determined via IP 
addresses and credit card addresses. However, de Wilde 
fails to consider that various Internet services involve 
more than only a supplier and a buyer; in the case of 
Facebook and Google, we have three actors: the Internet 
platform, the users and the advertisers. These three actors 
may be in three different countries. 
De Wilde also argues that production and consumption 
should be taken into account. In the case of online adver-
tising, the consumers of the platform services are also the 
producers of content, data, metadata and the attention 
that make online advertising possible in the first place. 
Accordingly, they are prosumers – producing consumers. 
Where prosumption platforms (including Google and 
Facebook) are concerned, the users’ important role in 
profit generation and value creation could be taken into 
account by taxing online profits and online advertising in 
the country where the user clicking upon or looking at an 
advertisement is located.
The IP address identifies the computer network from 
which the user is connecting to the Internet. IP addresses 
are allocated to the country of the Internet service pro-
vider. When visiting an Internet platform, it is standard 
procedure for the IP address to be retrieved and usually 
stored for each access. This enables advertising to be per-
sonalised according to countries and places. Accordingly, 
the IP addresses from which platforms are accessed are 
standard data retrieved and stored by the platforms. If 
an online advertising tax based on the model described 
above were to be introduced, the Internet platforms using 
online advertising technically would be able to identify 
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and store information on the country in which the user 
is at the time of the advertising interaction for each indi-
vidual online advertisement sold. 
Even though the Internet is a global medium and the 
Internet economy is transnational in nature, it is clear 
that each user will be in a certain country at each point in 
time that he or she accesses the Internet. In order to solve 
the complicated issues related to the clash between the 
global Internet and national legislation, using the user’s 
location as the decisive variable in certain cases thus 
seems logical.
There are concrete ways of how to calculate the amount 
of online advertising tax payable by a specific digital cor-
poration. The suggested model could be implemented in 
such a way that in the UK (or in other countries), compa-
nies such as Google or Facebook would be required to sta-
tistically analyse what proportion of payment-generating 
advertising clicks or impressions were executed in Britain 
(or in whichever country is charging the online advertis-
ing tax). The corresponding national share of the global 
profit, global value creation and global turnover per year 
could then be used as the financial basis for calculating 
the payable annual online advertising tax. Another option 
would be to calculate profit, value creation and turnover 
according to the country’s share of global active users as 
the financial basis for taxation; however, this would pro-
duce only a rough estimate.
The comparatively simple alternative when taxing 
online advertising through a traffic tax would be to use 
the sum of the advertising fees charged via British IP 
addresses, whereby this amount could be the result of 
fixed transactions or of advertising clicks and impressions.
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The majority of Internet access takes place from comput-
ers, laptops, mobile phones and tablets, whose users are 
located in a given country and using a specific national 
Internet or mobile network provider. Travellers who nor-
mally use a provider in their home country but are con-
necting with the Internet via a mobile network provider 
based in the country they are travelling in constitute an 
exception. In cases such as these, agreements between the 
providers regulate how the connection charge is divided 
up. For a long time, comparatively high roaming fees were 
charged. In the European Union, these roaming fees have 
now been abolished. If a traveller with a German mobile 
network contract connects to the Internet in the UK using 
a British mobile network provider, then her/his device was 
in British territory. Accordingly, it would make sense for 
each of the advertising clicks carried out by this user while 
in the British communication network to be counted as 
advertising clicks carried out in the UK. The reason for 
this would be that the device in question (mobile phone, 
tablet, laptop, etc.) was in British territory at the time of the 
connection. If a traveller joins a local Wi-Fi network, he or 
she will be given an IP address registered to this network. 
Accordingly, advertising clicks should be attributed to the 
country in which the Wi-Fi network is located. Travel-
lers’ IP addresses constitute a special case, the technicali-
ties of which need to be considered when introducing an 
online advertising tax. Mobile phone networks need to use 
dynamic rather than static IP addresses to connect with 
the Internet. However, the majority of Internet traffic in 
any given state comes from the users based in said state 
using the networks operating in that state.
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7.3. Models of Digital Value Generation and the Humanist 
Labour Theory of Value
If we assume that it is human labour that creates value, 
then this assumption has specific implications for differ-
ent international digital business models. The author rec-
ommends that legislating taxation of the digital economy 
is based on specific models of digital value-creation such 
as the following ones. Here are some of them (see Fuchs 
2017a, chapters 5–10; 2008, chapter 7):
•	 The digital content as commodity model: In cases 
where digital content (such as software) is sold as 
a commodity, it is decisive how many employees 
are located in which country and what share of the 
international corporation’s labour-time and salaries 
they account for. Microsoft is an example of a busi-
ness that fits this model.
•	 The online advertising model: In such models, 
targeted advertising is sold as a commodity. Digi-
tal platforms act as constant capital. Users produce 
data that is valorised in the form of personalised ads. 
For each ad that is shown on a profile and then gets 
clicked upon, one can determine in which country 
the value-generating view or click took place. Exam-
ples of this model include Google and Facebook.
•	 The online retail model: Online retailers such as 
Amazon buy commodities that they sell online. 
They are first buying goods that they then sell to oth-
ers. These commodities are fixed capital, to which 
the retail workers engaged in the sales, packaging 
and transport process add value that constitutes the 
total commodity value. The service of retailing is the 
real commodity in this case. For determining value 
shares it is therefore decisive where the sales, pack-
aging and transport process takes place.
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•	 The sharing economy-pay per service model: In 
this digital economy model, a platform mediates a 
service between a producer and a buyer and charges 
a rent on the service. The producer of the service 
generates its value, on which the platform owner 
charges a service fee/rent. The service creator (e.g. 
the Uber driver, the freelancer creating a digital 
product mediated via a platform such as Upwork, 
the babysitter advertising his or her services via an 
online platform) is located in a particular country so 
that this service’s value can be nationally allocated.
•	 The sharing economy-rent on rent model: In such 
models, no new good is produced, but an already 
existing good is rented out via a platform that 
charges a rent on the transaction. A rent on rent is 
created. The most well-known example is Airbnb. If 
this rent shall be taxed, then the decisive aspect is 
where the renting process takes place. Each flat or 
house rented out is located in a particular country.
•	 The digital subscription model: In the case of digital 
subscription services such as Netflix, Spotify, Ama-
zon Prime, or online newspapers it is not a physical 
asset which is rented out, but access to a collection of 
digital resources. Other than in the case of real estate, 
where a rent is paid for the use of a property over a 
specific time period, in the case of reproducible cul-
tural products, royalties are paid that depend on the 
number of uses (e.g. number of plays or downloads of 
a song or film) or the size of the good (e.g. number of 
pages of articles or books). In both cases, it is decisive, 
in which countries the cultural producers (musicians, 
actors, writers, performers, etc.) are located. Take as 
an example the online music companies Bandcamp 
or Spotify: on Bandcamp, artists and fans sign up.  
Artists offer their music for sale that is bought by 
fans. Each artist offering music for sale is tax-resi-
dent in a specific country, which means that for each 
transaction the location of value-generation can be 
determined. On Spotify, users pay a specific monthly 
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subscription fee for access to a vast collection of music 
albums that can be streamed. Spotify pays royalties to 
rights-holders who are located in specific countries. 
In order to determine the tax base in one country, for 
each subscription fee paid by a user, it must be deter-
mined how many songs that user has listened to over 
a year and what share of rights-holders/producers is 
located in which country. Doing so allows the genera-
tion of a tax base for each country.
•	 Mixed models: There are also mixed models that 
require taxation based on a combination of models 
(so, for example, Spotify combines an advertising 
model and a subscription model).
The discussion shows that defining a digital permanent 
establishment needs not just to take into account where 
value is produced and how much value is produced, but 
also who produces that value. It requires a differentiation 
between different digital business models that involve dif-
ferent forms of value creation.
defining a digital permanent establishment needs 
not just to take into account where value is pro-
duced and how much value is produced, but also 
who produces that value
In respect to the digital advertising model, Austria is 
an interesting case because it collects a 5% advertising 
levy on advertisements in printed works, on radio and 
television and in the public space. The applicable law is 
the Advertising Tax Act. The price of one advertisement 
forms the basis of assessment. At present, online advertis-
ing is exempt from the advertising tax. But recently, dis-
cussions have emerged that suggest extending this law to 
also cover online advertising. As this report has shown, 
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Internet advertising is becoming increasingly economi-
cally dominant. Therefore, it seems pertinent to consider 
extending the advertising tax to online advertising or 
introduce a special online advertising tax act. According 
to WARC data, Internet advertising turnover in Austria 
was 549.2 million US dollars (around 523 million euros) 
in 2015. A hypothetical 20% online advertising tax would 
thus produce an income of around 105 million euros, 
which shows that an online advertising tax would have 
significant economic potential in Austria. A 10% online 
advertising tax would currently produce income of 
around 52 million euros. It should be noted that all trends 
suggest that online advertising will continue to rise mark-
edly. Were an online advertising tax to be implemented, 
of course it need not automatically be fixed at 5%, as in 
the case of other advertisements – it could be higher. The 
fact that global Internet companies often elude corpora-
tion tax through their complex business and financial 
architecture should be taken into account. 
According to media reports, Google Austria GmbH 
had an estimated turnover of 140 million euros in 2015 
but paid only 126,785 euros in taxes (Delcheva 2016). 
Thus, it seems reasonable to apply a tax rate to online 
advertising that is significantly higher than 5% of adver-
tising turnover. This discussion has shown that there is a 
need for alternative Internet platforms, and that an online 
advertising tax has the potential to create them.
Section 7 has introduced a method for taxing online 
advertising. An online advertising tax could be used for 
funding an alternative Internet. The next section points 
out some foundations of public service alternatives.
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8. Towards A Public Service Internet: Funding, 
Infrastructure and Formats
One of the reasons why no alternatives to Californian 
Internet companies’ dominance have been able to estab-
lish themselves in Europe is that public service media’s 
Internet potential is underdeveloped and subject to legal 
restrictions. The reason for this is that in Europe just 
like in the USA, Internet regulation has been based on 
the neoliberal governance model that gives preference 
to for-profit corporations in the digital economy. Were 
an online advertising tax to be introduced, there would 
be the option of using the income thus generated to cre-
ate public service Internet platforms and launch a pub-
lic service Internet offensive (Fuchs 2017b; Fuchs 2018, 
chapter 7). The corporate Internet has in the last instance 
resulted in problems such as tax avoidance, fake news, 
fake attention, a flourishing of hate speech and discrimi-
nation online, algorithms that replace human online 
activities, etc. Taken together, the corporate dominance 
of the Internet has thereby posed a threat to democ-
racy. In contrast to this, a public service Internet is an 
attempt to strengthen the digital public sphere and digital 
democracy.
There is a range of conceivable public service Internet 
platforms whose creation could be financed through an 
online advertising tax. In the UK, one possibility would 
be to create a public service emulating YouTube (BBC-
Tube), on which all of the BBC’s legally available archive 
of programmes could be made available to users for reuse 
with creative commons licences. Users could also upload 
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their own videos to this platform and would have the 
additional option of remixing and reusing BBC-archive 
material. Public service broadcasting’s educational man-
date could thus be realised in the Internet in the form of 
‘digital creativity’. This concept could conceivably apply not 
just to video, but also to audio and radio archive material. 
There are dozens of public service media institutions in 
Europe. If all or some of them were to pursue similar pro-
jects (ARDTube, ZDFTube, ORFTube, ERTTube etc.), then 
there would be the option of creating a network of these 
platforms or setting them up as a joint platform, which 
could establish a popular European public service online 
media platform able to compete with YouTube, Google and 
Facebook in terms of popularity and reach. The users would 
be given ample space to develop their own digital creativ-
ity. A pan-European digitisation project would be needed 
to digitalise the television and radio archives. Projects such 
as these could be started on a national level, if they do not 
exist already. Income from an online advertising tax could 
be used to strengthen the public service Internet, i.e. Inter-
net platforms run by public service media (Fuchs 2014). 
The key aspect of such platforms is that they are not pri-
vately owned, but operate as public services without adver-
tising and as non-profit ventures.
This strengthening of the public service Internet would 
require changes to current legislative conditions, which 
make it difficult for public service media to offer Internet 
services (see Fuchs 2014 for a more detailed discussion). 
Legal restrictions preventing the establishment of public 
service Internet platforms (based on the view that public 
service-based online platforms would distort the market) 
have now led to a situation where American for-profit 
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platforms such as Facebook and Google are dominating 
the markets. At the same time, today we have no Euro-
pean Internet platforms of transnational significance. 
Therefore, a change in thinking is surely appropriate. 
Public service Internet platforms would be a counter-
force to the monopolies of Facebook, Google & co. and 
could open up new spaces and possibilities for content 
creation, creativity, political online debate, and content 
distribution beyond the logic of capital accumulation.
If a public service Internet strategy were to be launched 
(with projects such as BBCTube, ORFTube, Club 2.0,16 
etc.) the legislative framework would certainly need to 
be revised. Alternatives to Google and Facebook’s domi-
nance in Europe are possible and feasible.
8.1 Applying the Online Advertising Tax Model to the UK
Figure 9 shows an example how this presented online 
advertising tax model could work in practice in the UK. 
The model visually represented in Figure 9 presents an 
online advertising tax with a hypothetical 20% tax rate on 
advertising turnover. The fictitious company Cheesebeer 
is using Facebook and Google to display personalised 
advertisements on the profiles of beer drinkers in the UK 
and Germany. The image shows four concrete personali-
sations, which respectively address users in Germany and 
the UK. The British finance authority (HMRC) only taxes 
the advertisements targeting users in Britain and leaves 
all other online advertisements aside. For both advertise-
ments, an online advertising tax of 90 cents in total is 
payable, corresponding to 20% of the cost of the adver-
tisements: A total ad value of €4.50 (€2 & €2.50) results 
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in a tax of 90 cents (=20%). This sum would be used to 
finance public service Internet platforms operated by a 
department of the BBC.
8.2 Alternative Approaches to Media Content in the Public 
Service Internet 
When the institutional basis for a public service Internet 
platform is built through a sound funding model with the 
Figure 9: Model of online advertising tax coupled with funding for 
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help of the digital advertising tax, the platform provides 
the space for innovative and alternative approaches to 
different kinds of media content. One idea for this is the 
format ‘Club 2.0’. Club 2.0 is an example idea of a public 
service Internet platform. Club 2 was an actual programme 
broadcast by from 1976 until 1995 by the Austrian Broad-
casting Corporation (ORF). In the UK, the format had the 
name ‘After Dark’ and was first broadcast on Channel 4. 
Club 2 was an open-ended, uncensored live debate 
programme that often featured controversial topics and 
guests. It provided a space and unlimited time for explor-
ing the complexity of specific topics and problems. Space 
and time are important features of the public sphere. In 
addition, a moderator is needed who invites the right 
kind of people, makes sure that all guests speak to a signif-
icant degree and listen to each other, that the right kind of 
questions are asked, that the debate is not interrupted, etc.
Is a version of Club 2 in the age of the Internet and 
social media platforms possible? Club 2.0 is an updated 
version of Club 2. Figure 10 visualises Club 2.0’s concept. 
There are some core features of Club 2.0:
•	 Ground rules: Club 2.0 uses Club 2’s principles. 
Club 2.0’s broadcasts are open-ended, live, and 
uncensored.
•	 Cross-medium: Club 2.0 is a medium that combines 
the Internet and live television.
•	 Online video: Club 2.0 is live broadcasts on televi-
sion and on an online video platform (C2Tube).
•	 No traditional social media: Existing commercial 
social media platforms, such as YouTube, Twitter, 
Facebook, Snapchat, etc., should not be integrated 
into Club 2.0 because they are based on a culture of 
speed, commerce and advertising that destroys true 
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debate. For example, broadcasting Club 2.0 on You-
Tube could result in disruptive advertising breaks.
•	 Autonomous video platform C2Tube: Club 2.0 
requires its own autonomous video platform – 
C2Tube. C2Tube broadcasts Club 2.0 and enables 
user participation.
•	 User-generated discussion inputs: Users can gener-
ate discussion inputs. Registration should require 
that users are non-anonymous because anonym-
ity can encourage the violation of communicative 
norms and validity claims. The number of users 
allowed to post during a debate may be limited in 
order to avoid high speed. Such a selection of active 
users could for example be set randomly. An alter-
native is that all registered users can participate. 
Video is a good input format for avoiding anonymity 
and creating social cohesion. It is best to limit the 
number of videos each user can post (e.g. to one per 
live debate). User-generated discussion inputs are 
uploaded to C2Tube.
•	 Interface of the studio debate and user-generated 
videos: At specific occasions and points of time, user-
generated videos are presented in the live broadcast 
as discussion inputs. In a three-hour long debate, 
there could be two to three video inputs. How would 
the videos be selected? Possibilities include random 
choice, selection by the Club 2.0 team, selection by a 
randomly chosen user, or guest selections.
•	 User discussions: Club 2.0 supports and encourages 
discussion between users during and after the live 
broadcast. Video- and text-based comments can be 
posted to each user-generated video that is shown in 
the live broadcast. Text-based comments could have 
a minimum length, videos a maximum length. In 
order to avoid high-speed debate and enable a slow 
medium, the number of comments (in video- and 
text-format) that can be made per user can be limited.
•	 Privacy-friendliness: Club 2.0 should avoid advertis-
ing and not collect, store and process user data and 
meta-data that are not needed for the pure operation 
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of the platform. Club 2.0 is a privacy-by-design 
platform that designs privacy into its platform but 
avoids anonymity. Privacy in the context of Club 2.0 
relates to the way user data is stored and handled. It 
does not mean anonymity.
•	 Social production: The production of user-generated 
Club 2.0-input videos should transcend individualism 
by encouraging the production of video inputs in social 
contexts. Club 2.0 is ideally integrated into educational 
environments, such as schools, universities, commu-
nity centres, youth clubs, adult education centres, trade 
unions, civil society associations, NGOs etc. Groups of 
individuals should be encouraged in such institutions 
to get together and co-produce content that contrib-
utes to the discussion. Even if only a small number 
of the videos resulting from such social settings are 
broadcast, there is still a positive educational effect: 
the production process will foster political debate and 
engagement among those who are involved in it.
There are also civil society alternatives to the corporate 
Internet. These have in recent times been discussed under 
the term platform co-operatives17. Platform co-ops are 
web platforms that are collectively owned by workers 
and users. One does not have to make a choice between 
advancing either public service Internet platforms or 
platform co-ops. Both constitute viable and important 
alternatives to the corporate Internet.
8.3 The Participatory Media Fee and the Commons-Based 
Internet
Parts of an advertising tax or of a general corporation tax 
could be turned into a participatory media fee: as people 
themselves are part of the value creation because they 
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create data and their data are being sold, letting them 
engage directly with the outcomes of those revenues 
might be good to close that circle and give them back 
some agency in the process. Each household or individ-
ual receives a particular sum of money per year (a public 
sphere cheque) that must be donated to non-profit civil 
society online platforms or other non-profit media and 
cultural organisations that advance the common good, 
do not use advertising, are non-commercial and non-
profit, are not associated with powerful organisations, 
and do not have a discriminatory purpose. Participatory 
budgeting and state power are combined in the model of 
the participatory media fee: the state taxes corporations 
and then passes on the achieved income via participatory 
budgeting to citizens, who donate their public sphere 
cheque to civil society platforms. As a result, non-profit 
civil society models of investigative and quality jour-
nalism and an alternative, non-profit Internet could be 
advanced. The participatory media fee can be understood 
as part of a basic income, a citizen income specifically 
dedicated to advancing the public sphere. It is important 
to stress that the participatory media fee should not be 
an alternative to the licence fee that in many countries 
funds public service media’s basic activities. Instead, the 
participatory media fee is an additional fee beyond and 
independent from the licence fee. Competition between 
public service media’s funding and the participatory 
media fee should be avoided because both public service 
media and civil society media play an important role in 
the public sphere.  Figure 11 summarises some of the key 
aspects of the participatory media fee.
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The model of the commons-based Internet is based on 
advancing the common good through civil society. The 
public service Internet model in contrast is organised 
by public service media organisations. However, the 
state has to play a different role in each: in the case of 
commons-based Internet platforms, the state organises 
funding through taxation and participatory budgeting. 
In the case of public service Internet platforms, through 
legislation the state directly creates public service media 
organisations and specific funding mechanisms such as 
the licence fee and/or an online advertising tax. In the 
first case, the state is a facilitator of media organisations, 
in the second one it is much more directly involved in the 
organisation through legislation, although public service 
media does not imply state media and means journalistic 
autonomy from the government. 
Figure 11: The participatory media fee.
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9. Conclusions and Discussion
The key conclusions can be summarised as follows:
The economic significance of online advertising:
Online advertising’s global revenue is increasing rapidly. 
If these trends continue, online advertising will soon take 
TV advertising’s place as the economically dominant 
form of advertising. 
Google and Facebook are advertising companies: 
Google and Facebook are not just communication and 
Internet companies; they are the world’s largest transna-
tional advertising corporations.
Google and Facebook’s duopoly in the field of online 
advertising:
Google dominates the search engine market, Facebook 
the social network market. Both markets display a strong 
tendency towards monopolisation. Facebook and Google 
both use personalised online advertising as an economic 
model. They process, store and market massive amounts 
of data and are thus typical of Big Data capitalism. Face-
book and Google dominate the field of online advertis-
ing, and this duopoly seems to be expanding.
Negative effects for public service media and the digital 
economy:
The trend towards a monopoly or duopoly in the increas-
ingly important online advertising sector may have nega-
tive consequences for the public service media sector and 
results in problematic levels of concentration in the digi-
tal economy.
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Tax avoidance & value-creating users: 
Google and Facebook have used complex global cor-
poration and financial architectures to avoid paying 
taxes. In a parliamentary inquiry into the tax avoid-
ance of transnational corporations, Google repeatedly 
argued that value is created by software development 
in California and algorithms in the placeless Internet, 
and that therefore no value – and no tax liability – is 
created in the individual countries in which Google 
searches are carried out. However, the Internet and 
social media are only communicative thanks to their 
users. A purely technological infrastructure would be 
pointless without users’ activity. The activities of the 
Google and Facebook users create content, commu-
nication, data, metadata and attention, which form 
the basis on which both companies sell personalised 
advertisements. The users create an important part 
of Google and Facebook’s economic value. For this 
reason, the taxation of Internet companies and espe-
cially of online advertising can take place in the coun-
try where a user (in the cost-per-view model) views 
or (in the cost-per-click model) clicks upon online 
advertisements.
Levying online advertising tax on the basis of all adver-
tising interactions on a country-level:
Online advertising is already personalised according to 
countries and places. The Internet is not placeless: every 
online action takes place from a specific physical loca-
tion within a specific country. It is technologically pos-
sible to ascertain which percentage of an online platform’s 
viewed and clicked-upon ads occurred in which country 
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in a given tax year. For an online advertising tax to work, 
there would need to be an obligation for the online cor-
porations affected to cooperate, capture the necessary 
data and report it. The data gathered could be used for 
the purposes of taxation and the taxation of online adver-
tising. The taxation of Google’s online advertising in a 
particular country could use the sums charged for trans-
actions operating via this country’s IP addresses as the 
basis of its calculations.
Online advertising tax to prevent tax avoidance:
Google has repeatedly argued that tax avoidance is not 
illegal. However, as many people see tax avoidance as 
immoral, ways should be found to force Internet compa-
nies to pay corporation tax and other taxes and thus con-
tribute to the common good. Introducing a tax on online 
advertising is one way to do so.
An online advertising tax is possible on the national 
level:
The introduction of a diverted profits tax in the United 
Kingdom shows that online advertising tax need not nec-
essarily be organised on a global level, but initially can be 
implemented nationally.
Sanctions, independence and resource issues:
Financial authorities with limited resources and lob-
bying by accounting firms can impact negatively upon 
the effective taxation of corporations. Introducing an 
online advertising tax should thus go hand in hand with 
strengthening the resources of the financial authorities so 
that these are able to effectively deal with the increase in 
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monitoring and administration required. Furthermore, it 
should be ensured that financial authorities work inde-
pendently of lobbying organisations and that legal sanc-
tions become applicable and are indeed applied when a 
corporation refuses to pay taxes or cooperate with the 
gathering of the tax data required.
Innovative approaches are required to tax Internet 
companies:
The G20 and OECD states argue ‘that profits [should be] 
taxed where economic activities generating the profits are 
performed and where value is created’ (OECD 2014, 4). 
Sales tax is usually charged where a commodity is sold. 
Some economists have suggested a destination-based cor-
porate tax: profits are taxed in the country where goods are 
sold, and not where they originate (Avi-Yonah 2016, 72). 
Both models (taxation in the location of the profit source, 
taxation in the location of the sales destination) assume that 
there are two relevant economic actors: the producing cor-
poration and the consumer. In the case of online advertis-
ing, however, we have three economic actors: the Internet 
platform, the platform users, and the advertisers. The users 
are simultaneously producers (of information, data, meta-
data, communication, social relations, and attention) and 
consumers (of web services and online advertising). Thus, 
the classic distinction between producers and consumers 
becomes irrelevant. In the case of Google and Facebook, we 
are actually dealing with prosumers (producing consumers). 
Because of users’ special significance, it seems appropriate 
to organise online advertising tax on the basis of the total 
advertising interactions of users in a given country during 
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the period of calculation. According to this model, Google 
would in a specific country thus pay tax on all the advertise-
ments that users in that country’s network interacted with. 
The EU in 2016 proposed developing a directive on the 
country-by-country reporting of corporation tax.18 This 
directive would oblige all multinational companies operat-
ing in the EU to annually publish their turnover, pre-tax 
profit, taxes paid, number of staff and kinds of activities for 
each EU country. If this directive is implemented, the activ-
ities of multinational corporations will certainly become 
more transparent to the public. However, it will not make 
tax avoidance illegal, which means that turnover and prof-
its could be shifted around between countries. Accordingly, 
there is certainly a need for national regulations on taxing 
multinational companies – and there is certainly the pos-
sibility of doing so in the field of online advertising.
For a proper legal definition of digital permanent 
establishments, one needs to identify different models 
of digital value creation based on the assumption that 
only human labour creates value:
If we assume that it is human labour that creates value, 
then this assumption has specific implications for differ-
ent international digital business models. Legislating tax-
ation of the digital economy should be based on specific 
models of digital value-creation, such as the digital con-
tent as commodity-model, the online advertising model, 
the online retail model, the sharing economy-pay per ser-
vice model, the sharing economy-rent on rent model, the 
digital subscription model, and mixed models (for more 
details see section 7.3).
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Opportunities for public service alternatives to Google 
and Facebook:
There is a vast and hitherto almost completely untapped 
potential to create public service Internet platforms 
(Fuchs 2017b; 2018, chapter 7). Realising this potential 
could reduce Google and Facebook’s predominance in 
Europe.
Introducing a tax on online advertising is one way to 
weaken Facebook and Google’s monopolistic power. If the 
income thus generated were to be used to strengthen public 
service Internet platforms, the foundations of an alternative 
model could be laid. For decades, unsuccessful attempts 
have been made to imitate the Californian Internet plat-
form model in the European Union. At the same time, the 
European public service media’s Internet potential has not 
only been inadequately supported and promoted – it has 
been legally restricted. As a result, there is no serious Euro-
pean Internet platform comparable to Google or Facebook. 
A change of thinking and the creation of social, technologi-
cal, organisational, economic and legal innovations in the 
field of Internet platforms that would act as an alternative 
to Google and Facebook could offer a solution.
An alternative Internet is possible: 
Introducing measures such as an online advertising tax 
and a participatory media fee allows the fostering of an 
alternative, non-profit Internet. An alternative Internet 
can be advanced both by public service media (PSM) 
organisations and civil society. Public service Internet 
platforms operated by PSM can be funded out of an online 
advertising tax. Example ideas for such platforms include 
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the open debate format Club 2.0 and the public service 
YouTube. A participatory media fee is a kind of citizen 
income that is funded through taxing corporations (and/
or advertising). The state taxes corporations and then 
distributes the resulting income through participatory 
budgeting to all citizens, who are enabled to donate and 
support civil society media and cultural organisations 
through this public sphere cheque. As a result, civil soci-
ety media and civil society Internet platforms (also called 
platform co-operatives) are formed. The public service 
Internet and the civil society Internet are complemen-
tary and should not be seen as an either/or option and 
as competing with each other. Both constitute important 
alternatives to the corporate Internet.
Several objections could be made to the online adver-
tising tax concept presented here; they will be addressed 
in the following section:
The first counterargument claims that location-based 
online advertising is technically complicated or impos-
sible. This is hardly a powerful argument, however, given 
that nowadays nearly all online advertising is personal-
ised according to country and location. In technological 
terms, the IP address from which an advertising interac-
tion takes place has to be stored for every online adver-
tisement displayed. Via the IP address, the country in 
which the Internet service provider establishes the con-
nection can be identified. Online advertisers would have 
to be legally obliged to collect and analyse these data.
The second counterargument states that Internet 
users can use proxy servers and anonymisation tech-
niques to hide their real IP address. Accordingly, online 
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advertisements’ country attributions can be falsified. 
However, the number of users who hide their IP address 
or surf anonymously is comparatively low. Most users see 
no point to this and furthermore lack the technological 
knowledge to do so. Online platforms such as Google 
and Facebook themselves have an interest in users using 
their real IP addresses, as this enables the correct loca-
tional personalisation of advertising. In this regard, 
there is no fundamental clash between the interests of 
the financial authorities and those of online advertising 
platforms. One possibility would be for online advertis-
ing to be turned off if an online advertiser recognises an 
anonymisation or IP address diversion, so that locations 
are not distorted. There are a certain number of users 
who oppose Internet advertising on principle and would 
welcome such an option.
The third counterargument claims that the model pre-
sented would encourage the state monitoring of Internet 
users. In the model under discussion, financial authori-
ties would need to be given the legal right to monitor the 
allocation of advertisements to countries to prevent fal-
sification and thus online advertising tax fraud – that is, 
there would need to be a legal basis granting tax officers 
the ability to monitor the data through random sampling 
so as to prevent and uncover fraud. As tax avoidance 
by Internet companies is a widespread phenomenon, it 
would be important to have such possibilities for legal 
monitoring. If financial authorities are given access to IP 
data and advertising interaction data, it would be possi-
ble to use and run comparisons with other databases to 
create financial profiles of users and combine financial 
data with online usage data. If this counterargument is 
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fetishised, however, it plays into the hands of the global 
Internet giants and their tax avoidance, as the interest 
in privacy is placed above enhancing the common good 
through corporate taxation. The key thing would be for 
this monitoring to comply with data protection stand-
ards. This would include sharing only the minimum of 
necessary data with the tax authorities, namely informa-
tion about the advertising interaction, the advertisement 
price charged and a technical confirmation that the user 
was in the country in question. The complete IP address 
does not need to be shared for this.
An independent data provider could develop a technol-
ogy with which the location of all advertisements could 
be automatically verified. The task of this provider would 
be to store a distinct identification number and the veri-
fication result for each advertisement offered within the 
country in question. The online advertising platform 
would also store this identification number and provide 
it, along with information on the advertisement price and 
the advertising interaction, to the tax office in case of an 
inspection. Personal data would never be shared. When 
the tax office carries out its sampling, it would contact the 
independent location data verification service and ask for 
certain identification numbers to be verified. 
Another objection related to the third counterargument 
is that public service Internet platforms would likewise 
encourage the monitoring of users by the state. However, 
firstly public service media are not the police but inde-
pendent institutions. The aim is thus also to increase their 
independence. Secondly, the extent to which public ser-
vice Internet platforms would collect and store personal 
data is not set in stone. They would not necessarily have 
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to store and process a host of private content and per-
sonal data, as Facebook does. A public service YouTube, 
for instance, would only require relatively little personal 
data. Thirdly, public media usually have far less interest 
in storing personal data than commercial providers such 
as Facebook and Google, as the latter are profit-oriented 
businesses for which personal data are worth their weight 
in gold. A public service media company would not fol-
low a private economic logic of profit and could much 
more easily restrict itself to storing only the necessary 
data and not collecting excessive data.
A fourth counterargument states that it is impossible to 
take legal action against Google, Facebook and similar 
companies if they refuse to cooperate. The British exam-
ple shows that the problem of lacking or inefficient tax 
control is first and foremost a problem of lacking staff. 
If an online advertising tax is introduced, then financial 
authorities should be given the funds to recruit large 
numbers of online experts and online tax officers. The 
advantage of the model under discussion is that it could 
be implemented on a national level, which renders con-
trols easier.
Sanctions to be applied if online advertising platforms 
refuse to cooperate, falsify data, avoid taxation or com-
mit tax fraud would also be important. The EU General 
Data Protection Regulation already contains a model for 
this: Article 83(4) and (5) offers the option of applying 
administrative fines of 2% or 4% of the company in ques-
tion’s ‘total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding 
financial year’, depending on the kind of infringement. 
This or a similar model could also be used in an online 
advertising tax law.
Conclusions and Discussion 89
None of these points of criticism speaks against the intro-
duction of an online advertising tax. The online advertis-
ing tax constitutes a media-political innovation that, in 
combination with a new public service media strategy, 
could create real alternatives to Google, Facebook and co. 
and form the basis for public service Internet platforms.
Putting an end to the power of transnational corpora-
tions is possible. An online advertising tax is possible. 
Another Internet is possible.
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Online advertising will soon form the largest share of global 
advertisement revenues. Google and Facebook netted 
profits of US $29 billion in 2016. While these two giants 
control more than 66% of all online advertising revenues 
complex legal company structures have minimised their tax 
liabilities. This extended policy report considers where they 
should be taxed and where the value of their activities is 
actually created. It argues that tax paid by those platforms 
should be levied in the country where platform users are 
located when they click on or view an advertisement. 
Furthermore, the report examines the practical steps needed 
to ensure transparent accounting of taxed transactions in 
order to avoid long term negative effects for media and 
democracy.
 
Considering counter-arguments the author makes the case 
for an online advertising tax alongside a public service 
Internet strategy that could support other viable platforms 
and counter the dangers of duopoly or oligopoly and the 
high risks of financial bubbles in a world where advertising is 
the Internet’s dominant business model.
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